Arg, I just realised another censorship threat. The more niehbors a node has that know his specialization, the higher the chance that cancer nodes will know about him.
Example say we have an N=10000 node network where nodes on average know about m=500 nieghbors, and f=1% of the nodes are cancer nodes (100 nodes). Then the chance that a particular nodes doesn't have a cancer node that knows about is: (1-f)^m = 0.00657 That means more than 99% of those "target nodes", where a particular piece of data is likely to be stored, have thier IP:ports known to the adversary. If he knows thier specialization, he can blast the crap out of them with a SYN flood. That just sucks! I thought I'd bring it up. I don't think there's much we can do about it except reduce the neighbor count, which may increase routing times. Maybe an option would be the "hostile enviroment" topology, where you only connect to people you can trust. Anyone else got an idea? Boy it would be sweet if we all had something better than TCP/IP like ATM where you can build connections with QoS guaranties, maybe in 20 years. DoS floods would be a thing of the past. Maybe we should just stay happy with a network that is broadly censorship resistant: You can destroy all of the data some of the time (by DNFing) and some of the data some of the time, (with this targetted attack) but you can't destroy all of the data all of the time. (YoYo is everywhere) This is good enough to piss of the RIAA, or anyone out to censor everything in freenet. I wish we could do better though. __________________________________________________________________ Gesendet von Yahoo! Mail - http://mail.yahoo.de Logos und Klingeltöne fürs Handy bei http://sms.yahoo.de _______________________________________________ Devl mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://dodo.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/devl
