On 31/03/14 20:11, Matthew Toseland wrote: > On 31/03/14 19:50, Arne Babenhauserheide wrote: >> Am Sonntag, 30. März 2014, 20:41:41 schrieb Matthew Toseland: >>> If we ensure that only nodes >>> with a proven track record of performance (or at least bandwidth) route >>> high HTL requests or participate in tunnels, we can slow down MAST >>> significantly. (Inspired by the "don't route high HTL requests to >>> newbies" anti-fast-MAST proposal). >> If that’s the only requirement, then the fix is trivial: Each node records >> for its connections, whether they fulfill the requirements for high-HTL >> opennet nodes. > Great minds think alike. ;) I posted a much more complex proposal, but > there may be a quick fix (which provides some limited benefit)... >> For example it could route high-HTL requests only to nodes which have at >> least 1/4th of its uptime*average bandwidth or are among the 1/4th of the >> nodes with the highest uptime*average bandwidth (choose the best match from >> that subset of the nodes). > Or even simpler, have a minimum connection uptime. If a node has stayed > in your connection list for a long continuous period, then it has > presumably performed reasonably well for you, or you would have dumped > it in favour of a different node. Of course there are issues around what > the minimum uptime should be... IMHO on nodes with sufficient uptime we > should aim to have a minimum peer connected time over a specific > threshold (e.g. 3 hours), because this represents a specific measurable > commitment of bandwidth from the attacker. One of the reasons I'm keen on having some global state as well as per-node limits is connection uptimes to specific nodes are usually relatively small. Right now the longest opennet connection times on my (admittedly slightly outdated) node are 5h49m and 5h25m. I don't think this is due to updates either.. that was yesterday IIRC. Ideally we would like to significantly inconvenience an attacker who is tracing a user who is "following the rules", so e.g. somebody doing forum posts; so we'd like to be talking days or even weeks, not hours.
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