Matthew Toseland writes: > You can still do a classic correlation attack: Connect to the node for > the whole duration of the request and count the proportion of the file > they've fetched from you…
This might not work as well as simply theory says, due to FOAF
routing. The first step is essentially random routing, since it routes
to your peers, not only to you, and one third of these are long
distance. And if you’re the best target for the content, then the
requests could still come from far off. And the second step still uses
FOAF routing, so it might radically change direction (probability arount
10% for 10 long distance peers).
However we know that it is possible to devise attacks against
Opennet. It won’t be trivial, but it is possible in theory and I am sure
that it can be implemented.
So what’s bothering here is not that they have an attack against
Opennet, but that they lie to court about the capabilities of their
attack (regardless whether its intentional or by misunderstanding
Freenet).
An attack against Opennet is also not a problem for the goals of
Freenet. An extremely cheap attack, however, is a problem, because that
would allow for surveillance of all users. If all actions in Freenet can
be tracked with a rack of 10-20 Computers (0.1% of the active Freenet
users), that’s a problem, because it allows recording what people
do. Insert the Kafkaeske response to the strong nothing to hide argument
here:
Solove, Daniel J., 'I've Got Nothing to Hide' and Other
Misunderstandings of Privastrong . San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44,
p. 745, 2007; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper
No. 289. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=998565
Best wishes,
Arne
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