One thing one could do about this is to have it so that the actual source of the data doesn't necessarily have to be the source either - he could set it to the reference in his datastore if he feels overloaded...
Besides, the attack strikes me as somewhat unlikely. It requires the situation where the attacker can find a sufficient number of documents that all route exactly the same to fill up all the nodes along the route - which shouldn't happen if the system works. Oskar Sandberg - mail/finger md98-osa at nada.kth.se - Crypto is a human right On Tue, 25 Apr 2000, Scott G. Miller wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > > The only problem I see is that if an adversary can somehow cause the nodes > along a link to fill up (maybe by requesting a whole lot of different > keys), he can be more and more certain that the source of an address is in > fact the original source. > > > > > Thus, for the most part, nodes behave like they currently do, but when > > they are near empty, they are much more aggressive about changing the > > DataSource. > > > > Does this sound reasonable? > > Scott > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: GnuPG v1.0.1 (GNU/Linux) > Comment: For info see http://www.gnupg.org > > iD8DBQE5Bd8rpXyM95IyRhURAhq0AKCW4LAna0OVdI393Ryi27k1lOF28ACgh1j3 > 2TaWDUkJgl2aXP6b0a6wXNc= > =gGsW > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > _______________________________________________ > Freenet-dev mailing list > Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net > http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev > _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
