> If they could eavesdrop on enough messages, though evil nodes, they might be > able to see that a greater-than-average proportion of messages with a > particular > trust list are coming from a particular node. Your node. We would therefore > *have* > to have onion routing.
I see, so you are saying that a trust list is specific enough to an individual user that it can be tracked over multiple requests. So if you always look for things signed by Bill and no one else does, then not only do they have a tag on all the content that you request, making it easier to trace back to your node, but once they find you, they have linked you to all of your requests that were looking for Bill's signature. Very tricky. Onion routing would certainly help just because it makes it more difficult for you to be traced back to your node. This problem is similar to what happens when you request unpopular information. Since your request is the only one in the system, it is easier to trace. This is worse, though, since the offending data goes out on multiple requests. Of course it's only a problem if you're filtering based on an unpopular signator, but that is certainly a possibility. It's an interesting problem. I'm sure we can work something out. The solution might just be that we need a mix network more than before. _______________________________________________ Freenet-dev mailing list Freenet-dev at lists.sourceforge.net http://lists.sourceforge.net/mailman/listinfo/freenet-dev
