On Sun, May 06, 2001 at 04:26:12AM -0400, Tavin Cole wrote: > > The document is encrypted and interleaved with the progressive hash > > control bytes. Its length must be a power of 2 _prior_ to the addition > > of the control bytes.
Since we're on the subject - can we dump the control bytes? A chunk system: * Send 2 bytes of length of incomming data or 0 to signal CB_RESTARTED * Send that many bytes of data Makes the checkering and stripping code simplier and so means that nodes don't have to pad to the end of a block when something goes wrong. All in all it would just be neater design unless someone has a great reason for control bytes which I'm missing. > Doh! Since we're padding the document out to a power of 2 (presumably > with zeroes ??) Zeros is reasonable since the padding is pre-encryption. But it does give a known-plaintext attack. Since the padding is disguarded it's upto the client to decide what to pad with - but I'd suggest something at least slightly random. AGL -- I never let my schooling get in the way of my education. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 240 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20010506/8b0e9db9/attachment.pgp>
