Possible solution to the problem that you can see that a request has
been initiated on a given node:
Requests can have either HTL, or HTL|P, where P is a number between 0
and 1 (this would be limited to a more realistic range by each node it
passed through). If request only has HTL, it is processed normally. If
request has HTL|P, there is a P chance that it is forwarded as is, and a
1-P chance that it is turned into an HTL only request. So depending on
the value of P, which can be set at the client end, we have a variable,
random number of hops before the main HTL starts. This should greatly
reduce the vulnerability to nodes seeing that requests are at a fixed
request HTL, without needing huge packets (mixmastered first few hops),
and without greatly increasing the variance of the request time, unless
the probability is set to a very high value. The bounds are a topic of
interest, as is the possible information leak of the probability - we
probably want a limited set of probabilities available to clients,
rather than the whole range, to avoid leaking too much information that
could uniquely identify a requestor. What do people think?
--
Matthew Toseland
toad at amphibian.dyndns.org
amphibian at users.sourceforge.net
Freenet/Coldstore open source hacker.
Employed full time by Freenet Project Inc. from 11/9/02 to 11/11/02.
http://freenetproject.org/
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