On Wed, Jun 14, 2006 at 10:01:00PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > Matthew Toseland wrote: > > If only the original requester slows down in response to relayed > > RejectedOverload's. Which is the case now. > > Sneaky :-) But in order to exploit that information, wouldn't you have > to be able to tell that a series of requests came from the same sender? > In which case wouldn't you already be able to perform a statistical > attack to estimate how close you were to the sender?
You might be able to do some kind of timing attack. It seems dangerous... > > Cheers, > Michael -- Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20060615/a0ed52b3/attachment.pgp>
