On Wed, Jun 21, 2006 at 09:40:21AM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >But this is not acceptable for security reasons: Under no circumstances > >is it acceptable on Freenet for the source to behave observably > >differently to other nodes on the path! > > We might be able to get away with it as long as there's enough > background traffic: the source will throttle its own requests and > therefore spend a larger part of its bandwidth forwarding requests for > its neighbours, but the overall number of requests shouldn't change.
It seems very doubtful. A last resort at best. And if you can recognize the packets as a group from their keys ... admittedly you can do correlation attacks anyway, but it does seem to make them considerably easier: you can be absolutely certain - even if we implement such countermeasures as random routing a whole splitfile as a grouping for a few hops before it officially starts. > > Cheers, > Michael -- Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/ ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20060621/d19fd3e4/attachment.pgp>
