On Saturday 22 December 2007 09:27, Volodya wrote: > > [ snip long security argument ] > > > > PROPOSAL: > > We can improve security against a distant, moderately powerful attacker doing > > a key-based search by never starting to insert a layer of the splitfile > > pyramid until the layer below has been *completely* inserted, not just made > > fetchable. We should also put dire warnings on the EarlyEncode option. > > Sorry if i misunderstand something, but isn't that truly only a problem with Promiscuous nodes? If you are on > true darknet will you really be more vulnerable if you announce the key in advance?
It depends on how powerful your adversary is. Darknet is not a panacea. It makes it a lot more difficult for the bad guy, but it is still possible to slowly penetrate the darknet, by social engineering, by remote OS exploits, by physical attack. Obviously this is far more expensive than attacking opennet, but it remains possible for a big enough prize - for example a dissident freesite's publisher. > > If i'm right then it would be more beneficial to only allow the node to calc the key in advance when > Promiscuous is off, which will also give people more reasons to switch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20071222/2af2c00e/attachment.pgp>
