On Monday 19 November 2007 22:45, Michael Rogers wrote: > Matthew Toseland wrote: > >> True. We could use the hash of the entire ARK key (including the secret > >> part) to generate the obfuscation key - that way a node handling the ARK > >> request won't be able to de-obfuscate the handshake. > > > > We could, but this would not help us with short-refs, as we'd have to ship > > both the pubkey and the secret decryption key, hence 64 bytes (bad!). > > The shorter the better, no argument there. Here's how I see the > tradeoff: short refs are 38 bytes and don't have to be kept secret; ARK > refs are 70 bytes and do have to be kept secret (because of the > decryption key), but they give us the ability to retrieve the ARK via > Freenet if a direct connection fails. In theory we could have both; in > practice I doubt most users will understand the difference. Personally I > think short refs are the way to go, but it's your call.
Well, 70 bytes is around the length of an SSK. So maybe it's still useful. I don't think we should leave it to the users to decide, at least not in simple mode. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20071119/8b2ca212/attachment.pgp>
