On Feb 1, 2008, at 11:57 AM, Matthew Toseland wrote: >> I'm not familiar enough with the details of the proposed ULPRs and >> how >> USKs and Frost and the like check for new updates / messages, but it >> seems possible that simple legitimate checks for new content would >> have a similar effect. Of course, failure tables would help a lot >> with that case, but they wouldn't help against a malicious attacker. > > Could ULPRs help to resolve it? Would it be possible to estimate the > demand > for a key (in a way which doesn't favour single nodes that constantly > rerequest, and is biased by links so that an attacker could only > attack > proportionately to the number of connections he has), in order to > decide > which requests to let through?
I guess you could add to the failure table which distinct links have requested a given key, and be more likely to let those through with more links (once the failure is timed out). It doesn't seem very granular, as I would suppose (in a small world network) that a re- request from a non-peer node would be very likely to show up on a different connection. -- Robert Hailey -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20080201/d8b0ca4d/attachment.html>
