Matthew Toseland wrote: > - The tunnel length is likely to be shorter than the routing length. So > P(predecessor = originator) drops from 1/routing length to 1/tunnel length - > say 1 in 15 down to 1 in 5.
True, the tunnels would have to be quite long. On the other hand we don't know how much information the hop counter and closest-location-so-far are currently revealing, so it's possible an attacker has a better than 1 in 15 chance of identifying the initiator during the routing phase. (For example, if the hop counter isn't MAX or MAX-1 then the previous hop can't be the initiator, right?) > Yes, but a clever attacker can reconstruct the topology for a few hops > without > too much difficulty. It's messy, I haven't come up with a good algorithm yet, > but I haven't really tried: there should be one. Good point, we should be pessimistic. Cheers, Michael
