On Wednesday 30 January 2008 15:24, Michael Rogers wrote: > On Jan 28 2008, Robert Hailey wrote: > >Inside China (in this case) > >there would be a viable freenet, and outside there would be a viable > >freenet but due to the few connections between them, keys could not be > >effectively fetched or put one to the other. > > Unfortunately even if we can solve this problem in the accidental case (by > using networks IDs for example), I don't see how we can solve it in the > deliberate case: someone creates a chain of Sybil nodes that occupies a > large region of the key space, so the attacker controls all traffic in and > out of that region. > > There only need to be two connections between the Sybil chain and the > outside world to keep the chain from collapsing into a point, so the attack > will work even in a pure darknet as long as there are at least two gullible > users. And the Sybil nodes don't even need to misbehave - they can swap > normally and respond normally to requests, but the small bandwidth between > the Sybil region and the rest of the network will make that region of the > key space effectively useless. > > And of course if there are only two connections to the outside world, the > attacker only really needs two nodes: the rest of the chain can just be > simulated.
Does routing work this way though? That's the question. > > Cheers, > Michael -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: not available URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20080130/bf2f5bd8/attachment.pgp>
