On Monday 02 August 2010 18:13:16 Thomas Sachau wrote: > Am 02.08.2010 13:48, schrieb Romain Dalmaso: > > I didn't mean that. If you run a darknet-only node, updating over > > http(s) will blow up your cover. Plus, such requests are easily > > identifiable and blockable at any level (country, firewall, ISP, ?). > > If you use your package manager and proper packages, the attacker would have > to have a closer look > into your traffic with your distro update servers. A simple filter for e.g. > freenetproject.org > should find nothing.
It will be a long time before there are "proper packages". However, keyword filtering is well established. > > And if you are suspected to run a freenet node, your ISP can still find out > with good chances, if > you are running freenet, since freenet still behaves a bit special in some > areas. True, but that's something we need to work on. Ideally Freenet would use transport plugins and the only way to identify a node reliably would be traffic flow analysis (i.e. detecting multiple long lived connections between domestic IP addresses). How difficult this is on a large scale is an open question, there are some indications that it's not hideously expensive... -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 197 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/attachments/20100802/bf3b5fb3/attachment.pgp>
