yanma...@cock.li writes: > On 2019-07-20 07:59, Arne Babenhauserheide wrote: >> Hi, >> >> yanma...@cock.li writes: >> >>> Now, my idea is this: You set up a public (onion or clearnet) frontend >>> where you can make and read posts, with its back-end being FMS. >> … >>> Frontends would be disposable and dime-a-dozen; a front-end with too >> To get to this situations, you must make it very, very easy to host >> them. This might be a major endeavor (but one which would benefit >> Freenet a lot). >> … > Well, would it? You can pass through FMS, and only intercept the parts > related to posting. You'd also want to intercept the progress screens > for downloads, which might be a bit harder.
If you want to make it dime-a-dozen, you need to make it easy to install Freenet with FMS already setup. > All you'd need to do is write the code that does the filtering. If you have actual IDs, you must provide a secure way to log in — not secure against the server, but secure against others users impersonating you. Visibility is also based on the ID, otherwise you don’t get real spam defense (you’d have to rely on the site hoster to manage spam for you). > What I'm curious about is how the identity generation should > proceed. In particular, can the WoT have multiple identities sharing > the same key? No, and that wouldn’t be a good idea, since they could switch to the other ID if they’d manage to trick the server into using another public name. > That makes implementation much simpler too, since you don't need to > pass on the IP info or treat onions as a special case. What you could > do otherwise is to use for instance the Spamhaus RBL. That would block If you block open proxies, then you exclude all tor users, but you don’t get real security, because botnets are horribly cheap. > Doesn't FMS already limit posting rate on the client side? Not that I know of. It has delay of messages to provide more anonymity. > Solving an additional captcha per week would be trivial to add. > This might be overkill though. Adds implementation cost, and now the > server gets access to non-public information (although it never has to > save it). Easier to just tell people to make a new identity once a > month. The server always has non-public information about the users. The question is just how to represent it. >>> Specifically, a user that didn't like this would set list trust of the >>> master identity to 0. Do you reckon this would happen? >> >> Yes, I think this would happen, because one bad apple would spoil the >> whole identity. >> >> But if you would find a way to pre-generate IDs and then assign them to >> new users (so the standard FMS spam-defense would work), then this idea >> could work. >> >> If the proxy had a main ID which gives trust-list-trust to these IDs, >> then people could decide whether they want to see the new IDs. >> > Well, this is what I'm concerned about. Do you reckon they would > blacklist the main ID's trust list, because it has too many children > which are rotten apples? Yes. It would then be the same as those public IDs (where the secret key was published intentionally) which get blocked after abuse. > Then the bots could agree on some protocol; they make posts announcing > themselves somewhere, and then these are assumed to take effect after > X seconds. If other bots find X too low, they rate them negatively, > but they all get to specify X. And a similar parameter, let's call it > Y. There are distributed leader election protocols. You could use a simple bully-protocol https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leader_election#Asynchronous_ring[3] > Bots which "jump the gun" would get blacklisted by the other bots > programmatically. Bots which censor messages would get blacklisted, > provided they didn't block all messages sent within a certain > timeframe. You’d likely have to block them via FMS and only consider bots in the distributed algorithm which are not blacklisted by given moderator IDs. > Another question is if FCP already supports a "stripped-down mode", > where it doesn't expose internal material, only stuff that's on the > network. I know SIGAINT ran a Freenet <-> Tor proxy, do you know how > they did it? There is public gateway mode, but I would not vouch for its security — it might have deteriorated over the past years of little usage. Best wishes, Arne -- Unpolitisch sein heißt politisch sein ohne es zu merken
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