Denis Koroskin wrote:
On Wed, 04 Mar 2009 13:55:57 +0300, Walter Bright
If software is in your flight critical systems, the way one proceeds is to *assume skynet takes it over* and will attempt to do everything possible to crash the airplane.

Assume you got a null-derefence under Linux. How are you going to recover from it? You can't catch the NullPointerException, so your program will fail and bring down the whole system *anyway*.

You design your critical system so it is not vulnerable to the failure of a subsystem of it, even if that subsystem is powered by linux.

For example, you might have two computer systems controlling the process. They vote, and if they disagree, they both are removed and the backup is engaged. The two systems use different operating systems - say one linux the other windows, they use different software written with different algorithms in different languages.

The space shuttle, for example, had 4 independent flight control computers voting, and a 5th (with reduced capability) that could be manually brought online in case the 4 primaries all failed.

Google did an interesting design for their Chrome browser. Each tab in it was powered by a separate process, meaning the hardware isolated it from the operation of the other tabs. So if the browser crashed in one tab, it wouldn't affect the other ones.

I've read elsewhere that if you want to create a robust system, you break it up into different modules and run those modules as separate processes (not just separate threads) that communicate via interprocess communication. Any particular module dying could then be restarted without affecting the rest of the modules.

The wrong way to do it is to lump everything into one gigantic process. Then, any failure brings everything down.

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