Most excellent answers!  I grok it now.

Thanks,

--
Eric Chadbourne
http://theMnemeProject.org/



------ Original Message ------
From: "Dr. Anthony Gabrielson" <agabriels...@comcast.net>
To: "Eric Chadbourne" <eric.chadbou...@gmail.com>
Sent: 10/21/2013 12:23:45 PM
Subject: Re: [Discuss] salt question

On Oct 21, 2013, at 11:22 AM, Eric Chadbourne <eric.chadbou...@gmail.com> wrote:

 Hi,

 I have a basic question about salt.

 I was reading this:
 http://www.openwall.com/articles/PHP-Users-Passwords

 And don't quite understand this line:
"Salts are normally stored along with the hashes. They are not secret."

So if they are not secret what is the advantage if your site is exploited? Such as if the salt is stored in a config file couldn't the attacker utilize this with his rainbow tables? Also I see in PHP crypt() you don't have to supply a salt. How does that work? Is there a distinct salt per hash, and if yes, where is this stored?

I have a log in system I wrote myself with sha1 but from everything I've been reading this seems inadequate.

 Thanks for any tips!

 --
 Eric Chadbourne
 http://theMnemeProject.org/

Hi Eric,
Think of salt as a multiplier which makes (pre-computed) rainbow table generation more complicated. When verifying a password, the equation is straightforward: crypt(salt, passwd_to_verify) == stored_passwd_hash. The original salt idea was to make it difficult for attackers because it should take a certain amount of time to compute a hash and the amount of space to store pre-computed rainbow tables for all salt values would be preventive. In reality storage space has dropped in price considerably and the rainbow table generation process is really easy to solve with a cluster; I know more than a few people continuously generating rainbow tables across all salt values. It is still better to use salt because there isn't a good alternative without going to Multi Factor Authentication.

Anthony

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