HI > >Also, DRM is promoted as a feature in other office-suites, so we do >need to understand and be able to state succintly where we stand on >the issue.
We first came across this problem a couple of years ago, and our (Joerg Heilig, technical lead, speaking for the Sun) stance at the time was that we would rather go with "digital signatures and encryption using open APIs and open standards (like XML signatures). We do not have information on how to use the Microsoft DRM in apps not coming from MS, like OpenOffice.org. It would be a requirement for supporting DRM to have access to these APIs but also to be able to replace the backend infrastructure that manages the certificates and the authentication behind the APIs. I do not see any indications that this information is going to be available soon. In the end it is the people who send documents around who will decide on how useful this feature is. Remember that you need to know that the recipient has at least MS Office 2003 and that she has a MS passport account or other account managed in a MS backend certificate store. This does not sound to me like a compelling picture looking at the level of trust that people have developed towards MS. I rather see people asking for a backend infrastructure that is based on public standards and implementations from multiple vendors to choose from." [1] Since this interview, we have of course been working on digital signatures, which provide security. In general, DRM is a) largely undefined but often means limiting what one does as a recipient with a file, and b) often pernicious where you find it (because it limits what you do with what you think is your property). In several interviews (or at least a couple; it was a big issue then; Joerg also was interviewed elswhere, on this issue, though I don't know if was published), I argued that Microsoft is terrorizing users, espeically enterprises, and using its DRM as a weapon to route them into using MSFT products alone. I also presented the counter: one can have just more than adequate security using the technologies Joerg describes, which are open, and not ultimately forcing a dependency on a secretive corporation. > >Regards Jacqueline -cheers Louis > [1] Joerg Heilig interview. <http://www.openoffice.org/editorial/interview_joerg_heilig.html> --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
