Cerita ini nggak mesti bener lho! 


------- Forwarded Message Follows -------
Date sent:              Tue, 8 Aug 2000 14:41:21 -0600 (MDT)
To:                     [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From:                   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject:                [INDONESIA-L] SEMPER FI - Info on the May 98 Incident in 
Jakarta

From: "semper fidelis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: The x-factor : some info on may 98 incident in Jakarta
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2000 18:51:18 GMT

Just in, the details are fuzzy, but the sources are very credible.

Back in May 98, when Jakarta was literally burning, the Navy Chief of Staff, 
Adm. Arief Kushariadi, was on his way for some pre-scheduled trip using the 
Navy helicopter. As he was flying over Jakarta, he could not help noticing 
the movement of rioters on the ground and the fires they started. He was 
amazed that he could not see any sizeable force of security personnel to 
oppose the rampaging rioters. He assessed the situation that strategic 
places such as the presidential palace had not been completely secured by 
sizeable military units visible from the air.

Being in a separate chain of command (thus he had no control of any Army or 
Police units), and thinking that Jakarta was in danger, he immediately 
contacted the Commander of Marines 2nd Infantry Brigade based in Cilandak, 
Jakarta. Adm. Kushariadi inquired of available forces that the 2nd Marine 
Brigade could move at that instant. To his surprise, the Brigade commander 
replied that he had none. All of his available forces had been BKO-ed to 
KODAM Jaya and they were already fielded when Adm. Kushariadi reached him 
over the radio. This even include all sombat support personnel, artilery and 
cavalry. The marines had a battalion of cavalry (amphibious PT-76 tanks and 
BTR-50 amphibious Armored Personnel Vehicle) in Cilandak. However, they 
remained in their base with nobody left to operate them.

Unbeknownst to the Admiral, the Marines based in Cilandak Jakarta had been 
involved in a plot engineered by Prabowo and his clicks. Prabowo had 
realized that the Marines was the only military unit that was able to 
contest his Kopassus in combat. He happens to be a good friend of Maj. Gen. 
Suharto, the Marine Corps Commandant at the time, when they shared quarters 
during SESKOGAB in Bandung a few years before. When Prabowo was in charge of 
Kopassus, he tried to bring the two corps closer together. Having almost 
unlimited source of funding (thanks to the support he enjoyed from Cendana), 
Prabowo not only beefed up his Kopassus but he also sent some contributions 
to the Marines, commanded then by his old roommate, Maj. Gen. Suharto. After 
living as a step son for more than three decades, the Marines received 
Prabowo contribution with a warm feeling. However, Maj. Gen. Suharto was 
aware of some moves from Prabowo that might follow the contributions.

It did come in 1997, when Prabowo proposed "to better integrate" Kopassus 
and the Marine corps. How ? By interchanging personnel between the two 
Corps. He wanted to have some Kopassus men in every Marine Unit and to be 
part of the unit during the operation. Maj. Gen. Suharto flatly refused this 
proposal. Politely, he explained to Prabowo that the Marine has a different 
doctrine from its counterparts in Kopassus. The Indonesian Marine (owing to 
much similarities to the USMC) follow the doctrine as a professional combat 
unit. They never did nor wish to ever raise their weapons against their own 
coutrymen. The marines subscribes to a frontal type combat style where the 
objective is as clearly defined as the identity of the enemy. When the 
Marines are landing on the beach, they must assume that the beach was part 
of Indonesian soil invaded by some foreign enemies. So "mendarat dan menang" 
just simply does not apply to the Indonesian Army doctrines.

Knowing that he could not influence the neutrality and professionalism of 
the Marines, Prabowo decided that he should at least tied up all available 
Marine Units in Jakarta area when his troops were to secure power from then 
defunct government of President Suharto. He was able to do this because Maj. 
Gen. Sjafrie Samsoeddin, the Commanding General of Kodam Jaya, was his old 
friend from the Academy and part of his group. Samsoeddin cleverly ordered 
the marines to stand guard at some less important locations far away from 
the area being destroyed by rampaging rioters.

Now, back to Adm. Kushariadi.  Realizing that there was no effective 
military unit to protect the Jakarta, the prudent Admiral immediately raised 
the Commander of the Marines 1st Infantry Brigade based in Karang Pilang, 
Surabaya. Kushariadi ordered Surabaya to get ready one full infantry 
battalion equipped for combat deployment (they did not have extensive PHH 
equipments). He also ordered Surabaya to get ready all available tank and 
panzer crews. Using all available planes belonging to the Navy fleet air arm 
(including the Nomad & CASA 212), the admiral instructed the marine 
battalion & its combat equipment to be flown in to Jakarta at all possible 
speed. As you may have suspected, the Navy did not possess planes with heavy 
load capacity, it took the small navy planes several sorties between 
Jakarta-Surabaya to finally air lifted the entire marine battalion to Halim 
Perdanakusuma air base in Jakarta.

As soon as the Surabaya marine battalion landed in Jakarta, Adm. Kushariadi 
ordered the infantrymen to secure strategic locations including the 
Presidential Palace area. The cavalry crew from Surabaya immediately started 
and manned all available tanks and panzers still sitting in their hangars in 
Cilandak. These tanks were then rolling into Jakarta street to join the 
marine infantry already in location.

Adm. Kushariadi thought he had saved the city from total mayhem. Well, he 
did, but unbeknownst to him, his action also foiled two opposing groups that 
were just getting ready to launch a coup: Wiranto's group facing Prabowo's 
group. Both Wiranto and Prabowo were cooking their own coup scenario. The 
situation in Jakarta was intentionally brewed to allow the deployment of 
combat troops in Jakarta using the riots as an excuse. While Wiranto and 
Prabowo were cooking up strategy to beat their opponents, they forgot to 
take into account the x-factor such as Adm. Kushariadi, who was totally 
outside the plot and unaware of the coup plans from either side.

So, now Jakarta is in chaos, the army troops from both factions are ready. 
But the arrival of a marine battalion from Surabaya, now supported with 
tanks , (note that the marine tanks are better armored and more heavily 
armed than those wheeled cavalry units fielded by Kodam Jaya) had rendered 
both Wiranto & Prabowo's plan unexecutable without serious consequences. If 
either Wiranto or Prabowo kept pressing forward with their coup plan, then 
they will not only face the other army faction but also a battalion of 
marines from Surabaya. Also, as soon as the three marine infantry battalions 
from Cilandak, which were BKO-ed to KODAM, realized that their brothers from 
Surabaya were here and there is a coup attempt in progress, then the full 
Infantry Brigades would retract themselves from under the control of KODAM 
Jaya and rejoined their original unit. Even under BKO, all marine field 
commanders would certainly put the order coming from their Chief of Staff 
(Adm. Kushariadi)and their own Brigade Commander much higher than orders 
coming from KODAM Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Safrie Shamsoeddin. 
Therefore, whoever wanted to press forward with their coup plan, they will 
have to face the entire Marine 2nd Infantry Brigade with an additional extra 
battalion from Surabaya. That is more than 4000 professional and very well 
trained combat troops complete with their artilery and cavalry.

Some inside sources indicate that Wiranto replaced ADM. Kushariadi a few 
months after the May Incidents because of what the Admiral did to save 
Jakarta. Regardless of the outcome and consequences of his actions, Adm. 
Kushariadi, the Marines, and the Indonesian Navy as a whole, had again made 
their selfless contribution to the survival of the Republic. But as usual, 
the Navy remained unnamed in the history pages of Indonesia. However, the 
people of Indonesia had witnessed how their marines display a true sense of 
military professionalism in the handling on various public unrest which 
culminated in the Semanggi Incident in November 1998. If only the people of 
Indonesia could find out the truth about May 1998 and the unparalleled role 
played by their Marines and Navy in the recent struggle of their country 
......

To all my marine brothers in Indonesia ..... Semper Fidelis !!!


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