I believe that PwdHash does rely on a certain level of proof of the
server's identity. The browser needs to decide that
the domain name that the server is presenting actually belongs to it.
This is usually done by relying on SSL/TLS.
If the false server can convince the browser that it is in fact the
targeted domain, then the browser will happily
transmit the full credential (H(password, domain)) to the server.
PwdHash does NOT require that the proved domain match anything the user
has in mind. That is, the identity
does not need to be presented to the user, or compared against anything
the user is doing. This seems to be the
primary problem in phishing attacks (the last foot). That's where the
real advantage of techniques like PwdHash are.
Terry
-----Original Message-----
From: Eric Rescorla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Digital Identity Exchange <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, 3 Jul 2006 13:41:29 -0700
Subject: Re: [dix] Agenda bashing
Eliot Lear <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
but I claim that the most *effective* way to prevent
phishing is to demand that the server prove its identity enough to
know
the right question to ask of the client. If PwdHash covers this
ground,
then we agree.
It doesn't. It uses an entirely different technique.
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