On 10/22/2021 9:31 AM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
From: Roberto Sassu [mailto:roberto.sa...@huawei.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 20, 2021 5:09 PM
From: Eric Biggers [mailto:ebigg...@kernel.org]
Sent: Friday, October 15, 2021 10:11 PM
On Fri, Oct 15, 2021 at 12:25:53PM -0700, Deven Bowers wrote:
On 10/13/2021 12:24 PM, Eric Biggers wrote:
On Wed, Oct 13, 2021 at 12:06:31PM -0700,
deven.de...@linux.microsoft.com wrote:
From: Fan Wu<wu...@linux.microsoft.com>
Add security_inode_setsecurity to fsverity signature verification.
This can let LSMs save the signature data and digest hashes provided
by fsverity.
Can you elaborate on why LSMs need this information?
The proposed LSM (IPE) of this series will be the only one to need
this information at the moment. IPE’s goal is to have provide
trust-based access control. Trust and Integrity are tied together,
as you cannot prove trust without proving integrity.
I think you mean authenticity, not integrity?
Also how does this differ from IMA? I know that IMA doesn't support fs-verity
file hashes, but that could be changed. Why not extend IMA to cover your use
case(s)?
IPE needs the digest information to be able to compare a digest
provided by the policy author, against the digest calculated by
fsverity to make a decision on whether that specific file, represented
by the digest is authorized for the actions specified in the policy.
A more concrete example, if an IPE policy author writes:
op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=<HexDigest > action=DENY
IPE takes the digest provided by this security hook, stores it
in IPE's security blob on the inode. If this file is later
executed, IPE compares the digest stored in the LSM blob,
provided by this hook, against <HexDigest> in the policy, if
it matches, it denies the access, performing a revocation
of that file.
Do you have a better example? This one is pretty useless since one can get
around it just by executing a file that doesn't have fs-verity enabled.
I was wondering if the following use case can be supported:
allow the execution of files protected with fsverity if the root
digest is found among reference values (instead of providing
them one by one in the policy).
Something like:
op=EXECUTE fsverity_digest=diglim action=ALLOW
Looks like it works. I modified IPE to query the root digest
of an fsverity-protected file in DIGLIM.
# cat ipe-policy
policy_name="AllowFSVerityKmodules" policy_version=0.0.1
DEFAULT action=ALLOW
DEFAULT op=KMODULE action=DENY
op=KMODULE fsverity_digest=diglim action=ALLOW
IPE setup:
# cat ipe-policy.p7s > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/new_policy
# echo -n 1 > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/policies/AllowFSVerityKmodules/active
# echo 1 > /sys/kernel/security/ipe/enforce
IPE denies loading of kernel modules not protected by fsverity:
# insmod /lib/modules/5.15.0-rc1+/kernel/fs/fat/fat.ko
insmod: ERROR: could not insert module
/lib/modules/5.15.0-rc1+/kernel/fs/fat/fat.ko: Permission denied
Protect fat.ko with fsverity:
# cp /lib/modules/5.15.0-rc1+/kernel/fs/fat/fat.ko /fsverity
# fsverity enable /fsverity/fat.ko
# fsverity measure /fsverity/fat.ko
sha256:079be6d88638e58141ee24bba89813917c44faa55ada4bf5d80335efe1547803
/fsverity/fat.ko
IPE still denies the loading of fat.ko (root digest not uploaded to the kernel):
# insmod /fsverity/fat.ko
insmod: ERROR: could not insert module /fsverity/fat.ko: Permission denied
Generate a digest list with the root digest above and upload it to the kernel:
# ./compact_gen -i
079be6d88638e58141ee24bba89813917c44faa55ada4bf5d80335efe1547803 -a sha256 -d
test -s -t file -f
# echo
$PWD/test/0-file_list-compact-079be6d88638e58141ee24bba89813917c44faa55ada4bf5d80335efe1547803
> /sys/kernel/security/integrity/diglim/digest_list_add
IPE allows the loading of fat.ko:
# insmod /fsverity/fat.ko
#
Regarding authenticity, not shown in this demo, IPE will also
ensure that the root digest is signed (diglim_digest_get_info()
reports this information).
I apologize for the delay in responses, but it looks like
you've figured it out.
This kind of thing is exactly what IPE's design is supposed to
solve, you have some other system which provides the
integrity mechanism and (optionally) determine if it is trusted or
not, and IPE can provide the policy aspect very easily to
make a set of system-wide requirements around your mechanism.
I'm very supportive of adding the functionality, but I wonder
if it makes more sense to have digilm's extension be a separate
key instead of tied to the fsverity_digest key - something like
op=EXECUTE diglim_fsverity=TRUE action=DENY
that way the condition that enables this property can depend
on digilm in the build, and it separates the two systems'
integrations in a slightly more clean way.
As an aside, did you find it difficult to extend?
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Zhong Ronghua
DIGLIM is a component I'm working on that generically
stores digests. The current use case is to store file digests
from RPMTAG_FILEDIGESTS and use them with IMA, but
the fsverity use case could be easily supported (if the root
digest is stored in the RPM header).
DIGLIM also tells whether or not the signature of the source
containing file digests (or fsverity digests) is valid (the signature
of the RPM header is taken from RPMTAG_RSAHEADER).
The memory occupation is relatively small for executables
and shared libraries. I published a demo for Fedora and
openSUSE some time ago:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-
integrity/48cd737c504d45208377daa27d625...@huawei.com/
Thanks
Roberto
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Li Peng, Zhong Ronghua
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