On 4/23/2014 8:59 AM, Michael Storz wrote:
Just saw it in my logs. You find the announcement at
http://postmaster-blog.aol.com/2014/04/22/aol-mail-updates-dmarc-policy-to-reject/
So much for the theory that DKIM ADSP-like strong policies would never
be used by big operations! And the irony, the IETF had just made ADSP
historic for this theory of "special case no one will use," and for
same interop mailing list problem. Maybe its time to make DMARC
historic too before it even gets a RFC! All that needs to be done is
change ADSP to DMARC below at the IETF RFC Status change link.
Technically, it is still almost no deployment, just a few BIG guys!!
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https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/status-change-adsp-rfc5617-to-historic/
RFC Status Change : Change the status of ADSP (RFC 5617) to Historic
ADSP has garnered almost no deployment and use in the 4 years since its
advancement to IETF Proposed Standard. While there are
implementations in code,
there is very little deployment and no evidence of the benefits that were
expected when the standard was written.
There is, however, evidence of harm caused by incorrect configuration
and by
inappropriate use. There have, for example, been real cases where a
high-value
domain published an ADSP record of "discardable", but allowed users on
their domain to subscribe to mailing lists. When posts from those
users were
sent to other domains that checked ADSP, those subscriber domains
rejected the
messages, resulting in forced unsubscribes from mailman (due to
bounces) for the
unsuspecting subscribers.
Assurances that are provided by ADSP are generally obtained out of
band in the
real Internet, and not through ADSP. Current deployment of ADSP is not
recommended.
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--
HLS
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