Sorry to be obscure.

For the moment, I am trying to add the quoted sentence at the beginning of
my treatise, which Murray thinks can be accommodated.

For the longer haul, I am trying to lay a conceptual foundation for
exception management,to frame later discussion.

 If I had my way, exception management would be part of the main document.
 It is risky to implement any new filtering method without a plan to detect
and resolve false positives.

But my best hope is that a follow-on BCP document will be created and that
it will address exception management.

Doug



On Fri, Nov 25, 2022, 3:46 PM Neil Anuskiewicz <n...@marmot-tech.com> wrote:

>
>
> > On Nov 25, 2022, at 5:53 AM, Douglas Foster <
> dougfoster.emailstanda...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > 
> > DMARC requires an evaluator to trust the design, but we lack a cogent
> statement of the theoretical basis for doing so.  Here is my proposed
> language:
> >
> > "The RFC5322.From address is not directly verifiable.   DMARC addresses
> this problem using proxy verification:   The From address is considered
> verified using the combination of a verified identifier and a meaningful
> relationship between the verified identifier domain and the RFC5322.From
> domain."
> >
> > Discussion
> > This language identifies the two axioms on which DMARC is built:
> > - a verified identifier, one of:
> >     RFC5321.MailFrom verified by SPF PASS or
> >     RFC6376 DKIM "d=" domain, verified by DKIM PASS
> > - a meaningful relationship
> >     Same Organization
> >     Which includes the subtypes of:
> >       same domain
> >       parent authenticates child
> >       child authenticates parent
> >       sibling authenticates sibling
> > These are chosen because they have broad applicability, such that
> reputation knowledge about the identifier is not required to produce a
> meaningful result.
> >
> > Like any heuristic, DMARC will sometime produces results which encourage
> a disposition different than what the evaluator wants, typically suggesting
> distrust when trust is intended.  This requires alternate verification
> strategies, but our core documents have not explained how exceptions should
> be handled, and a best practices document is not yet started.   Therefore,
> it is worth examining how alternate authentication can be achieved by
> altering the axioms:
> >
> > Alternate identifiers could include:
> >     ARC Set "d=" domain validated an intact ARC set
> >     Server host name validated by forward-confirmed DNS
> >     Sender header domain validated by DKIM signature
> >
> > Alternate relationships include:
> >     "Vendor to Client" -- the From domain is trusted to have a client
> relationship with the validated domain
> >     "Delegated authenticator" -- The From domain is trusted to have been
> successfully validated by a previous server
> >     "Trusted impersonator" -- The validated domain is trusted for
> impersonation because it only impersonates for beneficial purposes on
> behalf on an individual domain account.
> >     "Trusted infrastructure" -- The validated domain is trusted to not
> impersonate
> >
> > There may be other identifiers and relationships that could be
> imagined.  None of these alternatives can produce general solutions,
> because they require knowledge which is external to both the message and
> the DNS.  However, these methods do provide the basis for local policy to
> address situations where authentication is needed but DMARC cannot produce
> PASS.
> >
> > ARC provides proxy validation using the combination of the ARC Set's
> "d=" domain identifier, the ARC Sets authentication results, and "Delegated
> Authenticator" as the meaningful relationship
> >
> > A website or organization which is known to impersonate, but only for
> beneficial purposes, can be validated using the server host name, verified
> by fcDNS, and "Trusted Impersonator" as the meaningful relationship.
> >
> > Proposals to use Sender as the alternate identifier have failed for two
> reasons: (1) by trying to create a general solution rather than a
> local-policy solution, and (2) failing to provide an alternative to "same
> organization" as the meaningful
>
> Sir, your knowledge of this domain is clearly deeper than I could ever
> achieve so it’s with deep respect that I acknowledge that I don’t grok what
> your highest priority is in terms of the standard. That is, what’s the
> highest priority problem and solution with solution defined as wording to
> be added to or changed in the document addressing the problem?
>
> Neil
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