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-----Original Message-----
From: Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> 
Sent: Friday, May 29, 2026 11:35 AM
To: Brotman, Alex <[email protected]>
Cc: Taavi Eomäe <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [dmarc-ietf] Re: New Tack - Learning from ARC Experiment

Brotman, Alex writes:
> 
> > Labeling ARC "historic" before DKIM2 proves itself as a replacement 
> > would serve no good purpose.
> 
> It might prevent people from deploying a mechanism that most have 
> decided serves no true purpose in its current form.

It might also make people not deploy mechanism that some people have decided 
are useful and provide useful information, even when that is not what ARC RFC 
specifies. 

Which lie outside of the "experiment", and nothing the IETF does could stop 
that.  If you want to misuse some specification, have at it. 


> Take a look at Section A.1 in RFC8617, and ask if we believe that ARC 
> (the experiment) has satisfied those goals.

The first bullet:

   o  Provide a verifiable "chain of custody" for email messages;

has not been satisfied, and I argue it was impossible from the beginning, 
exactly same way as DKIM2 will be impossible. To get that, would require that 
we would need to update all servers participation in the mail chain, and that 
is impossible.

I would say that DKIM2 has a far better chance than ARC ever did.  I think that 
goal largely depends on the actions/policies created at a later date by 
receivers. 

All other goals have been mostly met:

   o  Not require changes for originators of email;

   o  Support the verification of the ARC header field set by each hop
      in the handling chain;

   o  Work at Internet scale; and

   o  Provide a trustable mechanism for the communication of
      Authentication-Results across trust boundaries.

ARC does not require changes in originators. It does support verification of 
the ARC header for those hops who set it (there is no chain). It does work on 
internet scale and it does provide trustable mechanism for communication of 
Authentication-Results from intermediately node to the end node.

IMO, it does not work at Internet-scale, and does not provide a trustable 
mechanism.


> I'm not suggesting there could not be a DKIM2 or ARC++ that revises 
> what exists today and makes it better, but this document, RFC8617, is 
> not what the email ecosystem needs to create a reliable 
> chain-of-custody.

Anything that tries to do chain-of-custody, or forces every intermediate nodes 
to change (DKIM2) will be failing on internet scale. There will be nodes for 
not supporting those handling emails for very very long time.

> Marking it as historic won't necessarily stop implementations or 
> deployments, though hopefully gives them serious pause. We had been 
> running ARC inbound for ages, and determined that due to the 
> various/differing ways that it was being used at other sites, it just 
> wasn't useful enough to rely on. As such, as a site-to-site 
> chain-of-custody, I see no value in what currently exists.

I think better plan is to remove the unachievable first bullet point in goals 
list, and remove all concept of chain from the ARC and publish it as standard 
track RFC.

I.e., remove following sections from the ARC RFC 8617:

2.3.  Chain of Custody
2.4.  Validation of Chain of Custody
4.3.  Authenticated Received Chain
4.4.  Chain Validation Status
5.1.3.  Only One Authenticated Received Chain per Message


and rewrite at least 5.2 (mostly just remove the chain properties, leave the 
way to verify one ARC set):

5.2.  Validator Actions

section "7.  Use Cases" most likely also needs changes, i.e., most likely some 
of those are no longer use cases, and there are some new use cases.

Note, that the section 11.1 Success Considerations says:

----------------------------------------------------------------------
11.1.  Success Consideration

   In an attempt to deliver legitimate messages that users desire, many
   receivers use heuristic-based methods to identify messages that
   arrive via indirect delivery paths.

   ARC will be a success if the presence of Authenticated Received
   Chains allows for improved decision making when processing legitimate
   messages, specifically resulting in equal or better delivery rates
   than achieved through the use of heuristic approaches.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

ARC do provide that. When I see ARC header from iki.fi which do say that 
SPF=pass, DMARC=pass when iki.fi received that email which is then forwarded to 
me, then it will "allow for improved decision making" and "better delivery 
rates ... heuristic approaches".

We did not get any failure conditions:

----------------------------------------------------------------------
11.2.  Failure Considerations

   ARC should function without introducing significant new vectors for
   abuse (see Section 9).  If unforeseen vectors are enabled by ARC,
   this protocol will be a failure.  Note that the weaknesses inherent
   in the mail protocols ARC is built upon (such as DKIM replay attacks
   and other known issues) are not new vectors that can be attributed to
   this specification.
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I at least do not know any new significant vectors for abuse cause by ARC.

It has many of the same failings as DKIM, and in some cases, makes 
Authentication reliability worse.  This has been stated by a few people on the 
list.

--
[email protected]




-- 
Alex Brotman
Sr. Engineer, Anti-Abuse & Messaging Policy
Comcast

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