On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 6:12 AM Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> wrote:
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > 11.1. Success Consideration > > In an attempt to deliver legitimate messages that users desire, many > receivers use heuristic-based methods to identify messages that > arrive via indirect delivery paths. > > ARC will be a success if the presence of Authenticated Received > Chains allows for improved decision making when processing legitimate > messages, specifically resulting in equal or better delivery rates > than achieved through the use of heuristic approaches. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > I think it succeeded in that. Almost all emails I receive have been > forwardered to me by some forwarders. I know those forwarders (iki.fi, > netbsd.org, ietf.org mailing lists, some other mailing lists). > > Email forwarding does not happen without the user interaction, i.e. I > myself set up all of those forwardings and specified that those > domains should forward those emails to me. > > When I receive email in my final mailbox I can use the ARC records > from iki.fi to see whether DKIM, SPF and/or DMARC succeeded when it > got the email. I do trust iki.fi so much that I allow it to forwarded > emails to me, thus I trust that iki.fi will do those checks properly. > > The only interesting thing for the Chain is those machines that I > trust. I do not care if someone else forwarded email before iki.fi got > it, as I do not trust those. I only care about ARC headers that I know > I can trust. > > Meaning the ARC was success as the precense of the ARC-records allowes > me for improved decision making when processing legitimate messages, > and checking those signatures is much better than heuristics using > Received headers or something like that. > I think we need to consider whether the success criteria were met generally. I would argue that an existence proof, while interesting, is probably not sufficient to establish consensus that the experiment was broadly successful. Put another way: You say it's valuable, but as I understand it, operators handling enormous mail volumes across the broadest cross-sections of the Internet have found that it's not. I'm not asserting that the big operators' opinions should automatically win the day, but we must reconcile that dissonance somehow. And I've heard a lot more assertions that it provides no incremental value than assertions supporting it. Then next section of the section 11 of ARC RFC 8617 lists failure > considerations: > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > 11.2. Failure Considerations > > ARC should function without introducing significant new vectors for > abuse (see Section 9). If unforeseen vectors are enabled by ARC, > this protocol will be a failure. Note that the weaknesses inherent > in the mail protocols ARC is built upon (such as DKIM replay attacks > and other known issues) are not new vectors that can be attributed to > this specification. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > The draft does not list any significant new vectors for abuse caused > by ARC, and I do not know any of such things, so I assume there are > none. > Whatever you may think of ARC and the value it provides, we can't ignore that adoption remains very low after seven years. My interpretation is that the community at large just doesn't see value here. This is presumably after plenty of experimentation at all levels, given the availability of free implementations, not to mention genuine deployment and data collection by large operators. I would argue that a failure criterion, whether express or inferred, is a lack of uptake. I think the more interesting line of inquiry is why uptake didn't happen. Maybe it was complexity, maybe it was a lack of endorsement by large mailbox operators, maybe it made headers too ugly, maybe making the users take extra manual steps is unacceptable, maybe a mix of those, maybe something else. Knowing that might also help improve the chances of something like DKIM2 succeeding. Section 11.3 then goes to Open questions, i.e., what we should have > learned from the experiment, but this draft does not answer those > either. > I think the intent there was "Assuming this succeeds, what have we learned from it?" We're answering a different question now. > So the summary is the current draft does NOT at all use the original > sucecss / failure criteria to check whether experiment failed. > I think those were technical criteria. We had high hopes and weren't anticipating such limited adoption at the time. -MSK
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