While a change to DMARC would nice, I think that SPF upgrades can be mitigated using existing infrastructure.

In order for a message to pass DMARC using SPF (which is susceptible to spoofing), the message needs an SPF pass (evaluated for the MAIL FROM address) and for the MAIL FROM address to be aligned with the From: address.

If a domain wishes for its mail to be only validated using DKIM, then that domain must not publish an SPF record with a pass qualifier (+).

As some mail providers also evaluate SPF separately and treat an SPF pass as more reputable, the sender might rewrite the MAIL FROM address to an unaligned address with a published SPF pass.

As an example, here's a zone file showing the DNS setup required. The MAIL FROM address would be rewritten from x@y to [email protected].

@ TXT "v=SPF1 ?mx -all"

_dmarc TXT "v=DMARC1;p=reject;aspf=s"

mail TXT "v=SPF1 +a -all"

On 14/08/2026 12:10, Douglas Foster wrote:
Awhile back, someone described the SPF upgrade attack to this list,
particularly mentioning Outlook.com

    - Bad guy initiates an impersonation message claiming to be from
    Megabank.Com.   Megabank.com is known to be hosted on Outlook.com
    - The bad guys send the malicious impersonation to his controlled domain
    AttackPartner.com, which is also hosted on Outlook.com.
    - AttackPartner.com accepts the message even though it fails SPF and
    DKIM, because it is part of the attack.
    - AttackPartner.com auto-forwards the message to VictimDomain.com,
    preserving the original SMTP address, remaining anonymous.  The message is
    accepted based on aligned SPF Pass.
    - VictimDomain.com acts on the message as if it is truly from Megabank.

Ways that the attack might be exposed:

    - If the hosting service rejects the original message because it lacks
    authentication.
    - If the hosting service enforces Mail From rewrite, with or without SRS
    encoding, then the role of AttackPartner.com would be exposed, and SPF Pass
    would be based on that domain.
    - If the hosting service created two ARC sets, one that documented the
    original destination domain and one that documented the final destination
    domain.   However, destination domains do not generally appear in ARC
    sets.   ARC was supposed to help us identify forwarding activity.   A
    forwarder who preserves the Mail From address is indistinguishable from an
    outbound gateway service, even with ARC.

DKIM2 gives us the destination domain information which ARC lacks, but
DKIM2 will not be used by a malicious impersonator.
Even if DKIM2 allows a domain owner to specify that DKIM2 is mandatory, the
attacker will simply redirect his attacks to a domain which does not have
this enforcement specified.

So we have no solution and no plan for a solution?

Doug Foster


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