On Mon, Feb 22, 2010 at 9:23 AM, Evan Hunt <e...@isc.org> wrote: >> This is absurd. If we're going to do this, I'd like the security >> considerations to reflect all of the non-zero probabilities of errors >> occuring (those that have a higher probability). > > I just answered this point in private mail to someone else, failing to > realize until after I'd sent it that it was off-list, so I'll repeat > myself... > > My point is not to say that hash collisions are a problem or that NSEC3 is > a poor choice. My point is that it's bad form to make mathematically false > statements--even if they're *almost completely* true--and especially so > when you get anywhere near cryptographers. > > "NSEC3 is exactly as good as NSEC" is a mathematical statement. It's very, > very close to true, but in math that still makes it false. "NSEC3 is as > good as NSEC except under conditions so fantastically improbable that it's > safe to ignore them" is a few more words, but has the benefit of actually > being *true*, and I think that's what the draft should say.
Well, I wouldn't want to say "NSEC3 is exactly as good as NSEC" in any case, since it's not true. It's more inconvenient to implement, and somewhat more secure. So, I agree that we shouldn't say things that are factually false, but I'm not overly concerned about this. -Ekr _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
