On Sun, 3 Oct 2010, Joe Abley wrote: > > At least some of the cases we're talking about involve signatures > necessarily made by keys after an emergency key roll which has taken > place because the old key has been compromised. Such signatures are > worthless.
This argument also implies that RFC 5011 cannot be used to roll over root trust anchors in the event of a compromise. It isn't immediately clear to me from the root KSK DPS whether you expect RFC 5011 to work in the event of a compromise. It says: As part of the KSK emergency roll-over procedures, ICANN maintains the capability of being able to generate and publish an interim Trust Anchor within 48 hours. In favorable circumstances, this interim Trust Anchor may be used to facilitate an orderly RFC 5011 [RFC5011] automatic KSK roll-over to a new and sanctioned Trust Anchor generated at a new scheduled key ceremony held with reasonable time notice. Does that mean you'll use 5011 to roll from the interim TA to the sanctioned TA, but that validator operators will have to manually install the interim TA? There seems to be a significant difference between 5011 and the root TA operational plan. 5011 suggests there should be a backup TA key pair which is generated and published well in advance, but not used operationally. It just exists to be ready in case of loss or compromise of the operational TA. The root TA has no such backup. Sorry for being so late to look at these documents in detail. Tony. -- f.anthony.n.finch <d...@dotat.at> http://dotat.at/ HUMBER THAMES DOVER WIGHT PORTLAND: NORTH BACKING WEST OR NORTHWEST, 5 TO 7, DECREASING 4 OR 5, OCCASIONALLY 6 LATER IN HUMBER AND THAMES. MODERATE OR ROUGH. RAIN THEN FAIR. GOOD. _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
