I'm sorry to be a sticky wicket here, but I have to ask: have you thought about what a guaranteed-correct implementation of this would look like? I think you need to actually do that analysis before we proceed with this. As best I understand it, getting this right is not trivial, and getting it wrong would be harmful. While it clearly would help in the context of widespread adoption of DNSSEC, I'm not convinced that the security risk of the added complexity would be compensated for by an actual reduction in woe at the root.
I would like to see the WG seriously analyze this problem before considering proceeding with either this proposal or the other. ________________________________________ From: DNSOP [dnsop-boun...@ietf.org] on behalf of Warren Kumari [war...@kumari.net] Sent: Wednesday, February 24, 2016 23:58 To: dnsop Subject: [DNSOP] Updated cheese-shop. Dear DNSOP, We have recently updated "Believing NSEC records in the DNS root" (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-wkumari-dnsop-cheese-shop-01). This incorporates some comments, but also does a better job of explaining the technique, what the benefits are, and why we are only handling the special case of the root zone. We believe that, in this limited use-case the suggestions in Section 4.5 of RFC4035 are not as relevant. We also believe that the NSEC case (and no wildcards :-)) is simpler to solve than the NSEC3 case. For these reasons we think that it is worth pursuing this in parallel with Fujiwara-san's "Aggressive use of NSEC/NSEC3" document. cheese-shop does not conflict with "Aggressive use...", rather it complements it, and can demonstrate the technique (in this restricted use case). We welcome any feedback, including tomatoes, howls of derisive laughter, etc. W _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list DNSOP@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsop
