On Tue, Jul 25, 2017 at 5:55 AM, Ted Lemon <mel...@fugue.com> wrote: > On Jul 24, 2017, at 8:59 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.li...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > and at the cache->auth layer it's potentially the case that the provider > can say: "use precision of /24" or "use precision of /17" ? So, there's > really not much "pii" that can be worried over at the > provider-cache-resolver (they already know who you are...) and they > (provider) can decide how much granularity is "important" to release to the > upstream authoritative cache. > > > There is no such thing as an upstream authoritative cache. The filtering > is being >
apologies, 'upstream (from the cache resolver's perspective) authoritative SERVER'. > done at the cache. This is not client subnet: this is client ID. So > the cache, which is not authoritative, is receiving PII about a specific > client machine. Being able to > I agree with this, the cache resolver sees the client's IP address. > filter the PII at the CPE would indeed improve privacy in this case; the > problem is that the CPE has to have a UI or API that allows that to happen, > and they don't. > > I don't think the CPE is the answer, the cache-resolver CAN decide to send along in it's edns0 option: "1.2.128.0/17" instead of "1.2.3.0/24". Or it seems to me that this is a fine knob to add to resolver software... granted you'd need some extra config about your client subnets in use. > The reason DNS filtering is useful is not that it is forced upon the end > user, but that it allows devices that use the default cache to get > filtering in a way that does not > I don't believe the goal of the draft is to enable filtering. Certainly for a nation-state actor you could see: "Oh, now I know what subnets use the resolver over there, so I can limit useful replies, or steer requestors toward 'better/approved' content' > depend on the software installed on them. So e.g. your IoT device can be > infected by a worm but not actually exfiltrate any private information to > the attacker, because the attacker's DNS is blocked. > > you seem to be conflating a few things here... or using 'content filtering' in a different way here than before in this response. > Being able to know that a particular device is a particular device is > actually quite useful in this context; unfortunately, there is no way to > distinguish "useful" and "personally-identifying". Even if you only > identify the IoT devices in your home, by doing so you reduce the search > space for identifying the other devices. > > I don't think the draft is aiming at 'device' as much as 'region of the network'. The cache resovler COULD choose to send /32 (or /128) level data in the edns0 option, but that seems counterproductive, and a bit invasive. -chris
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