>> On May 3, 2018, at 3:27 PM, David Huberman <david.huber...@icann.org> wrote:
>> In practical terms, when any type of registry strips away a lame delegation
>> attached to a real, operating network with users behind it, and things break
>> as a result…

Woody replied:  
> But isn’t that, by definition, impossible?  What could break as a result of a 
> _lame_ delegation 
> being removed?

Mark provided you with a forward DNS example. Here’s a _common_ reverse DNS 
example:

You are the registrant of 192.168.0.0/17.
You setup a single SOA record for 168.192.in-addr.arpa instead of properly 
defining 128 records 
for each /24 reverse zone.

PTR queries to the NSes will work (for the /17).  

But you’ll fail the lameness checking at an RIR because the RIR checks all 
zones in the
SOA record, and assumes that if you assert 168.192.in-addr.arpa, that you 
really meant
to claim authority over the /16.

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