>> On May 3, 2018, at 3:27 PM, David Huberman <david.huber...@icann.org> wrote: >> In practical terms, when any type of registry strips away a lame delegation >> attached to a real, operating network with users behind it, and things break >> as a result…
Woody replied: > But isn’t that, by definition, impossible? What could break as a result of a > _lame_ delegation > being removed? Mark provided you with a forward DNS example. Here’s a _common_ reverse DNS example: You are the registrant of 192.168.0.0/17. You setup a single SOA record for 168.192.in-addr.arpa instead of properly defining 128 records for each /24 reverse zone. PTR queries to the NSes will work (for the /17). But you’ll fail the lameness checking at an RIR because the RIR checks all zones in the SOA record, and assumes that if you assert 168.192.in-addr.arpa, that you really meant to claim authority over the /16.
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