https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dhc-rfc3315bis-13
On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 8:53 PM, Marek Vavruša <mvavr...@cloudflare.com> wrote: > On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 5:48 PM, Ted Lemon <mel...@fugue.com> wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 8:33 PM, Marek Vavruša <mvavr...@cloudflare.com> > > wrote: > >> > >> > You say that your proposal does not impact DoT's ability to address > the > >> > threat model or use case that is the reason it is being used. But > this > >> > is > >> > doesn't make sense to me. The trust model for DoT and DoH right now > is > >> > that they are configured by the user for the user's reasons, or by the > >> > service provider for the service provider's reasons. You are > proposing > >> > >> This is the issue that the draft is trying to solve. The service > >> provider doesn't have a way > >> to configure DoT on the stub resolver. This problem is described in > >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310#section-6.7 > >> What I'm trying to address more specifically is > >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8310#section-7.3 > > > > > > The document explicitly says that it doesn't have a trust model for > DHCP. > >> > >> > >> The "DHCP authentication" does exist, I believe you're referring the > >> deployment status. > > > > > > No, I'm referring to it doesn't exist. There is no deployable DHCP > > authentication. The DHC working group tried to come up with one, and > > ultimately concluded that it was not worth it, because the only thing > that > > should ever be trusted from a DHCP server is information about the local > > network. DoH and DoT are out of scope for DHCP according to this > > reasoning. Bear in mind that we were more optimistic about > authentication > > when we did RFC 3315. RFC 8415, which is in AUTH48, and which > supersedes > > RFC3315, is not as optimistic, and only provides for authentication using > > IPsec between server and relay, and authentication for the purpose of > doing > > Reconfigure; this authentication is not sufficient to provide assurances > of > > trustworthiness. It's about as secure as a TCP sequence number. > > > >> > >> I'm happy if we say the draft must depend on RFC3315, or discuss the > >> trustworthiness of the responses, > >> but surely there must be a way forward if we want to keep the > >> recursive DNS (last mile) decentralized and free from tampering. > > > > > > There is a way forward: seriously figure out the threat model. Tom > > Pusateri and another author already did a DHCP document; the reason we > > didn't advance it is that we weren't able to come up with a threat model > > where configuring DoT or DoH made sense. Until someone does that, > there is > > no point in doing further work on a DHCP option. If we do do further > work > > on a DHCP option, Tom's document is more complete than yours. > > Can you share the link for the draft for a reference? > > Marek >
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