On Thu, Aug 25, 2022 at 1:35 PM Ben Schwartz <bem...@google.com> wrote:
> (Also, Brian's analysis indicates that the origin hostname's address > record TTL would bias the endpoint selection, but this is not correct.) > This statement intrigues me, and I think is highly relevant to the discussion. Could you explain further? Is this non-bias the result of logic embedded in the draft that I have overlooked? Or is what you are referring to an implementation artifact within Chrome? For purposes of focusing on the draft, I would like to limit this to things in the draft; if it isn't in the draft, but it addresses the concerns raised, the obvious answer is: please add it to the draft - The goal is to standardize the behavior, by explicitly including everything authority servers, resolvers, and clients need to do to interoperate with the same characteristics - If only some of the clients have this good behavior, but others do not, that is not good for the usability of HTTPS records - If this is added to the draft, and addresses the concerns, I may withdraw my objection (which would clear the draft for publication). - If it is already in the draft, but not obvious, then cleaning up the text to make it obvious, is something I think would be in everyone's interest. Thanks in advance, Brian
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