On 21. 02. 26 4:50, Mukund Sivaraman wrote:
Dear Fujiwara san,
On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 04:28:22PM +0900, Kazunori Fujiwara wrote:
Dear dnsop WG,
Authors submitted draft-fujiwara-dnsop-dns-upper-limit-values-05.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fujiwara-dnsop-dns-upper-limit-values/
Would you also consider adding a limit on the size of the RSA public
exponent "e" in the DNSSEC validation path? There is no low limit on the
public exponent in PKCS #1 (it can be up to modulus - 1). While the RSA
modulus itself is limited by DNS RFCs 3110 and 5702 to a max of 4096
bits, there is no limit on the public exponent (it can be up to modulus
- 1).
I think a DNS group should not be specifying limits for crypto
algorithms. If you can find a suitable reference to another document,
that could be referenced.
In other words, leave this to crypto experts :-)
--
Petr Špaček
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