FTR, with my implementors hat on: > or their clients, are validating. This does mean that the resolver will need > to track how the data entered it's cache, and will have to additional queries > if an incoming query with DO arrives for an cache entry which was populated > without DNSSEC info.
This part is the worst idea ever. The fact that validating resolvers need to deal with +CD already make the internal state of the resolver cache already complicated enough that every time I touch this area I wish that there was no support for the CD bit in the protocol. I don't really want more complexity in this area. Additionally, whether the resolver should be validating or not "by default" should be the policy decision of the resolver, not of the clients. We already shot ourselves into the legs with CD-bit, so lets not give the DNS clients a second shotgun... Ondrej -- Ondřej Surý (He/Him) [email protected] A gentle nudge is always appreciated if I take a little longer to reply. > On 30. 10. 2026, at 23:33, Warren Kumari <[email protected]> wrote: > > Draft: draft-wagope-dnsop-do-bit - "Clearing the DO bit for DNSSEC" > > Some of us were chatting at the recent ICANN meeting about impediments to > adoption of PQC algorithms in DNSSEC. > > One of the big concerns is that PQC signatures will almost certainly cause a > fallback to TCP, and this may cause significant load issues for both > authoritative and recursive servers. > > While only something like 40% of resolvers worldwide perform DNSSEC > validation, because of the way the DO bit works, all recursives request this > data, whether they need it or not. > > This draft updates[0] RFC4034 - "Resource Records for the DNS Security > Extensions" to recommend that recursive resolvers only set the DO bit if > they, or their clients, are validating. This does mean that the resolver > will need to track how the data entered it's cache, and will have to > additional queries if an incoming query with DO arrives for an cache entry > which was populated without DNSSEC info. This trades complexity and > additional queries for less TCP fallback. > > The authors cannot figure out if this is the best idea ever, or the worst > idea ever, but we wanted to share it and get your feedback. > > Warren, Peter and Geoff. > — > [0]: More correctly, this draft will be updated to update RFC4034 if the WG > decides that the idea is worth pursuing. I had some initial OLD / NEW text, > but I pulled it out to keep the initial version short and readable (and > because the draft-cutoff arrived faster than expected, and I didn't have time > to tidy it up more :-) ) > > _______________________________________________ > DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
