To close the loop on this, I've proposed a PR to add this to the threat model and security considerations explicitly:
https://github.com/ietf-wg-dnsop/draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques/pull/228/changes On Wed, Oct 14, 2026 at 5:47 AM <lirx25= [email protected]> wrote: > > Thank you for sharing your thoughts. I appreciate your perspective and > understand the practical concerns you raised. I agree that using unique > random validation tokens is an important best practice that should be > encouraged across applications. > > AliasLeap could serve as a useful real-world example illustrating the > potential security consequences of not adopting this practice. In > particular, the risks are not limited to dangling DNS records but can also > arise from CNAME following in otherwise legitimate DNS configurations. > > I believe briefly mentioning this scenario could further reinforce the > importance of the draft's existing recommendations, without requiring any > substantial changes to its scope or direction. > > Thank you again for considering my suggestions and for your efforts on > this draft. > > Best regards, > Ruixuan > > > > -----原始邮件----- > > 发件人: "Paul Wouters" <[email protected]> > > 发送时间:2026-10-14 05:38:09 (星期三) > > 收件人: [email protected] > > 抄送: "Erik Nygren" <[email protected]>, > [email protected], [email protected], > [email protected] > > 主题: Re: [DNSOP] Re: Security consideration for > draft-ietf-dnsop-domain-verification-techniques > > > > On Tue, 13 Oct 2026, [email protected] > wrote: > > > > > I agree with the draft's recommendation to use unique validation > tokens, as this is an effective mitigation against the AliasLeap attack. I > do not think the current > > > recommendations are incorrect, but they may overlook some security > risks. Therefore, I believe it would be reasonable to discuss the risks > highlighted by AliasLeap > > > in the Threat Model, Security Considerations, or the CNAME usage > section. > > > > The document is mostly about how to do things right, not on explaining > > the many wrong things one can do. The document aims at a concrete BCP, > > and this is different from a whitepaper about a found security issue. > > > > > For these reasons, I believe that prohibiting CNAME following during > DCV is a necessary security measure. > > > > That is going to be very very difficult, as most people who implement > > DCV are application developers, and not DNS engineers/experts. They > > will just use an existing DNS server or library and that in turn > > will just follow CNAMEs. Asking them to develop some backend code > > that has custom DNS processing will be very difficult and also > > error prone. > > > > Therefor, randomization remains an essential property that developers > > should not skip. > > > > Paul >
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