> > Good question! I personally think a resolver should refetch the data
> > it has in the cache that does not live up to a client's request for STRICT
> > privacy.
> 
> OK, then I misunderstood what you had in mind for this.
> 
> My assumption was that the client is expressing requirements for
> how the resolver will process cache misses. If there's no cache
> miss, there's no special handling required.

If an attacker has control over a resolver's cache then a timing
attack is possible. If we go down that path then ultimately
every client would need it's own cache.

However, nothing ties such an attack to a specific value of the option or
to the option at all.

So my preference would be a document that describes the intent of the client
and leaves out exactly how a resolver would meet the requirements.


_______________________________________________
DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to