I am writing this not having accessed my email for a few days, so events may have moved beyond the posts which impelled me to write. But I think it's worth protesting against the oversimplification and misrepresentation. Nicole is wrong: multi-nationals are not an extension of the state; the state is increasingly an extension of the multi-nationals. The world's richest three men have the combined GDP of the 48 poorest nations; the very largest multi-nationals are responsible for four-fifths of foreign direct investment and half of world trade. These people control national policies in ways which are not, shall we say, in the interests of nations or, more importantly, their inhabitants. Look at the banana crisis: the EU protection affects 3 per cent of world trade in bananas, and supports the economy of, for example, the Windward Islands. In whose interests is it to end this protection? Not the Windward Islands'. Not the consumers', whose choice would disappear (Caribbean bananas are smaller and very different tasting). And you can bet that it won't be the workers on Latin American plantations who profit either. It will be the owners and shareholders of the multi-nationals who control the Latin American banana industry (except, as I understand it, in Ecuador, which may explain why Ecuador is not getting a piece of this action). Perhaps you have shares in Chiquite, Nicole? Her analysis of colonialism and neocolonialism could do with more acknowledgement of the complexities of the issues, and less easy moralizing. People in power, whatever their colour or gender, can be relied upon to behave badly (this country had 13 years of Mrs Thatcher); the surprise is when they don't. I don't mean that we should just shrug our shoulders: quite the opposite. The ways and means of colonialism and its successors repay careful study, and careful differentiation. A Sri Lankan friend of mine spoke to me about the three periods of colonialism undergone by her country: almost exactly 120 years each of Portuguese, Dutch and British imperialism. She spoke of the very different technologies available to each, and their different cultures, and how they have affected Sri Lanka to this day. She also gave me a thumb-nail overview of each period: the Portuguese were the least racist of all [presumably, at least in part, because the concept of race was not available to them at that time, although my friend did not mention that], but they were violent, unpredictable and obsessed with [the Roman Catholic] religion; the Dutch were less obsessed with religion, were not especially violent, but were obsessed with trade and profit; the British were the most racist of all, hardly bothered with religion, but obsessed with justice (British-style). It was, she said, you pays yer money and makes yer choice, except, of course, the inhabitants had little or no choice. On the other hand, she said, it was interesting to note how different Sri Lankans had different 'favourites' (she was being mildly ironic) amongst the oppressors--it told you a lot about them, she said, and also was a helpful predictor in guessing their politics in the current mess. I was reminded of her take on colonialism when I recently read a review by Edmund S Morgan in the New York Review of Books (3 December, 1998) of Ira Berlin's Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries of Slavery in North America ($29.95 (hardcover) Belknap Press/Harvard University Press) and Philip D. Morgan's Slave Counterpoint: Black Culture in the Eighteenth-Century Chesapeake and Lowcountry ($49.95 (hardcover), $21.95 (paperback) University of North Carolina Press): I quote in part from the review here, but I would urge anyone to read it in full. It is online at http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/archives.html (click Search and enter the details): <<The negotiations [between master and slave] were not conducted across a table or on anything like a level playing field. Rather they were embedded in the daily transactions between master and slave, mainly in the work place. Work was always at the center of them and "informed all other conflicts between master and slave," including conflicts of culture. Berlin sees the cultural autonomy expressed both in the continuation of African patterns of behavior (braided hair and filing teeth in the traditional manner, clandestinely performing African rites at births and burials) and the creation of new ones as deliberate and purposeful. While the contours of slave life might vary as negotiations shifted, the beliefs, attitudes, and activities that slaves nurtured among themselves always had an "oppositional content," even if concealed in the mimicry of dance or later in the metaphors of a folk tale. In places where the body of slaves had come directly from Africa, as in eighteenth-century South Carolina, they often carried so deep an attachment to old customs that "the conflict over work and over culture became one." >> I do believe that it is demeaning to the oppressed to refuse to acknowledge such power as they do have; and it is bizarre to absolve Third World governemts, armies and individuals of responisbility for what they do, good or bad. Sure, the US, France and Britain (and most other countries you could name) meddle, interfere and generally contribute to mayhem, and deserve to be exposed and vilified; but so do the people who aid and abet them. The article from the Financial Times which Nicole was kind enough to bring to our attention mentioned the difference between the relationships which France has with its ex-colonies in Africa and those which Britain has with its ex-colonies there, but she rather ignores them. They are illuminating. The French explained their imperial mission as one of civilization, specifically, of course, French civilization; the colonized were expected to appreciate that civilization and were (very moderately) rewarded when they did. The British liked to explain their empire as a matter of accident and noblesse oblige and pax Britannica and such; on the whole the 'natives' could admire as much as they liked, but could also dream on. There is, presumably, some connection between these two stances and the post-colonial picture, where the French are far more active (and far more welcome) in their ex-territories than are the British in theirs. On the other hand, and I find this intriguing, when those Africans visit or migrate to the erstwhile Mother Country today, the positions are rather the other way around. No one would call Britain unracist; but it is a significantly less nasty place for a black person to be than France. Nicole's account of the EU also misses the mark, I think. If her version was correct (that the EU is there as a way for Europeans to regain from the US the hegemony they have lost in the world), then one would expect Britain to be in the EU van, and within Britain, one would expect the right-wing (who were traditionally the supporters of imperialism) to be the great EU fans. It ain't like that. Britain (speaking broadly of successive governments since WW2) has always been suspicious of the EU, not least because the EU's original and enduring impetus was a rapprochement between France and Germany, in a bid to end European wars (such as had begun WW1 and WW2). Mrs Thatcher was virulently anti-German, despite the fact that the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was in all respects of her own cast of mind (except that he was German and therefore not to be trusted and an enemy of Britain), and this had a great deal to do with Britain's strange policies towards Europe during her years. The left-wing, however, traditionally anti-imperialist, is broadly pro-European: partly because the left's anti-imperialism is in some cases translated as anti-Americanism, but mainly because of the EU's anti-nationalist feel. Those on the left who oppose the EU do so mainly because of the EU's status as a 'rich man's club'. The EU is also about providing a balance in the world--it used to be expressed a need to provide a middle ground between the USA and USSR; now it is presented as a counter-weight to what would otherwise be an unimpeded US hegemony. I do not deny that; but it's all far more complex than Nicole's writing suggests. We're not writing books here, and if we were these might not be the books we wrote, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't admit that few issues are simple. And as for Nicole's response to Joe's point about Imam: well, I've never fancied David Bowie myself either, and super-models strike me as a waste of newsprint and a corruptor of youth, but I damned if I can see what any of that has to do with a woman pleading for the life of her family. Shame on you, Nicole! Susan
