On 2016-04-27 12:20:46, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> The first patch (for MdeModulePkg) fixes a bug that is exposed
> (triggered) by the third patch.
> 
> The second and third patches fix a security vulnerability in OVMF that I
> reported to the UEFI SRT more than three weeks ago:
> 
>   To: secur...@uefi.org, secal...@redhat.com [...]
>   From: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com>
>   Subject: OVMF PlatformBds allows circumvention of SMM
>   Message-ID: <5701256d.8010...@redhat.com>
>   Date: Sun, 3 Apr 2016 16:15:09 +0200
> 
> I have not received any response thus far.
> 
> As can be seen above, I also reported the issue to the Red Hat SRT.
> While I received acknowledgement about my report, there has been no
> technical feedback either.
> 
> Now, this issue has very low impact in my opinion:
> 
> - Configurations (that is, (host kernel, QEMU, OVMF firmware) triplets)
>   on which the issue being fixed is *actually* a vulnerability count as
>   "very recent" and "sporadic" at best. I'm not aware of any deployments
>   where such a configuration is put to use in a production environment.
> 
> - If Secure Boot is enabled, then the attacker's job is much harder: he
>   cannot install just any UEFI driver in DriverOrder (see the second
>   patch for more explanation), he must instead exploit a bug in an
>   already signed UEFI driver, before that driver is blacklisted in DBX.
> 
> Independently, Ray's work for porting OvmfPkg to MdeModulePkg/BDS
> includes a patch, namely
> 
>   [edk2] [Patch v3 11/23] OvmfPkg/PlatformBds: Initialize console
>                           variables in *BeforeConsole()
>   http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.comp.bios.edk2.devel/10859/focus=11039
> 
> that needs to connect the PCI root bridges on the call stack of
> PlatformBdsInit(), not the current PlatformBdsPolicyBehavior(). Since
> patch #2 in this series implements a superset of that requirement, and
> given the low impact of the security issue (and the unresponsiveness of
> the USRT), it makes sense for me to post this small series first, and
> for Ray to rebase his work on top second.
> 
> I tested these changes in OVMF, with
> 
>   { S3 enabled, S3 disabled } x { SMM enabled, SMM disabled },
> 
> using Fedora guests.
> 
> Public branch: <https://github.com/lersek/edk2/commits/lockdown_smm>.
> 
> Cc: Feng Tian <feng.t...@intel.com>
> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen....@intel.com>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>
> Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu...@intel.com>
> Cc: Star Zeng <star.z...@intel.com>
> 
> Thanks
> Laszlo
> 
> Laszlo Ersek (3):
>   MdeModulePkg: PiDxeS3BootScriptLib: honor PcdAcpiS3Enable
>   OvmfPkg: PlatformBdsLib: lock down SMM in PlatformBdsInit()
>   OvmfPkg: PlatformBdsLib: lock down SMM regardless of S3

2 & 3 Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.jus...@intel.com>

> 
>  MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/DxeS3BootScriptLib.inf |  1 +
>  MdeModulePkg/Library/PiDxeS3BootScriptLib/BootScriptSave.c       |  4 +
>  OvmfPkg/Library/PlatformBdsLib/BdsPlatform.c                     | 89 
> ++++++++++++--------
>  3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 1.8.3.1
> 
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