I don't think Juliano will mind my getting this posted given it was addressed to edu-sig in the first place.... consider this yet another test.
Kirby From: Juliano <julianofisc...@gmail.com> Date: Tue, Mar 1, 2016 at 6:36 PM Subject: Re: [Edu-sig] raging debates and the relevance of a real education To: kirby urner <kirby.ur...@gmail.com> Cc: "edu-sig@python.org" <edu-sig@python.org> 2016-03-01 21:50 GMT-04:00 kirby urner <kirby.ur...@gmail.com>: > > Students lucky enough to get exposure to RSA (the algorithm) along their > math track are likely having more informed debates in their classrooms, > regarding the Apple vs. FBI standoff. > > They're certainly better equipped, concept-wise, than less privileged kids > who might not even get any SQL in all four years of high school (!). > > The first stories I saw were about how the run-of-the-mill techie saw no > reason to weigh in i.e. why pick a side? > What is your opinion? Is FBI attacking the privacy of iphone users? Today the brazilian police arrested Diego Jorge Dzodan, Facebook Latin America VP. Police claim he disrespect a court order: provide whatsapp history of drug trafficking suspects. IMO brazilian police was totally overstated and overbearing. BUT, couldn't the Facebook collaborate with criminal investigations? The difference: Facebook indeed has access to the data in question. Apple did not. > > > Then came the heavy hitters like John McAffee and Gen. Hayden. > > An aspect of the story I see differently reported is: > > (A) when the passcode is miss-entered more than 10 times, the phone wipes > away its data (99% of the stories put it this way) > > (B) the phone doesn't have to wipe anything except the decrypt bits, > leaving the phone encrypted forever (1% put it this other way). [1] > > One might argue the difference between "erased" and "indecipherable" is > negligible, but as we were discussing "mental models" earlier this month, I > think it's an important distinction to make. > > The "erased" mental model leaves people understanding why the FBI couldn't > get to the data in that case: it's gone. The "forever encrypted" mental > model reminds people of something else: the data is still there, just the > code in uncrackable. > > A lot of father-knows-best types (e.g. Cyrus Vance) would like the public > to forget all about uncrackable codes. > > Were the algorithm in question RSA, we could say the phones owner needs > the passcode to get access to d, the secret complement of N, the public > key. [2] > > Even if I know my public key, forget about decryption of d is lost, and > that's a lot longer than 6 digits. Getting the passcode right is merely > giving d permission to do its work. > > I wonder how many evil sibs have deliberately miss-entered codes to > forever lock the other's phone. That'd be akin to tossing it under a bus > right? Tsk. [3] > > Kirby > > PS: I wonder who believes this paragraph (I don't): > > "It’s possible, of course, for authorities to physically open the phone, > pull out the computer chips and bombard them with lasers or radio > frequencies to get at the information they need. But experts aren’t sure > how much — if any — data would be lost in the process." [4] > > Sounds like BS to me. > For me as well. My question: Is the FBI able to clone the data (like a unix dd command)? Once the data is cloned, they can test as many as required passwords. When the system blocks the information, they can load the cloned data again. I apologize if I am talking nonsense. I really would like to know why the FBI is not able to do it (like CSI lol). > > [1] > https://stratechery.com/2016/apple-versus-the-fbi-understanding-iphone-encryption-the-risks-for-apple-and-encryption/ > > [2] > http://controlroom.blogspot.com/2006/05/rsa-using-pythonic-notation.html > > [3] > http://forums.macrumors.com/threads/a-hack-to-find-my-sisters-password-for-the-login-screen.237721/ > > [4] > http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2016/02/17/the-fbi-wants-to-set-a-legal-precedent-not-break-into-an-iphone/ > > > > _______________________________________________ > Edu-sig mailing list > Edu-sig@python.org > https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/edu-sig A secure communication system is like a weapon: for one is a right, for others is a danger, a well-meaning citizen can use and a terrorist (or child molester) too. +1 FBI team Juliano Fischer Naves
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