UMR 8590 - IHPST - Institut d'Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques
13, rue du Four - 75006 PARIS *Séminaire d'épistémologie des modèles* organisé par Franck Varenne (franck.vare...@univ-rouen.fr) & Vincent Ardourel (vincent.ardou...@gmail.com) Bonjour à toutes et tous, La troisième séance du séminaire d’épistémologie des modèles de l'IHPST aura lieu le *mardi 22 janvier* à *15h00* (IHPST - Salle des conférences). Nous aurons le plaisir d'accueillir *Pablo Lorenzano *(Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, Argentina). *Titre et résumé de la conférence de Pablo Lorenzano:* *Explanations in Classical Genetics: A Model-theoretic Account* The aim of this talk is to analyze the kind of explanations usually given in Classical Genetics. Explanations in biology have intriguing aspects to both biologists and philosophers. A summary of these aspects are found in the introduction to the anthology *Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences* (Braillard & Malaterre 2015). We will outline four of the most salient problems in the current debate. These problems are related to (1) whether natural laws exist in biology, (2) whether causation plays a specific explanatory role in biology, (3) whether other forms of explanation – e.g., functional or teleological – are also needed, and (4) whether the recent mechanistic type model of explanation that brings together some form of law-like generalizations and of causation fulfill all expectations. (p. 9) With our analysis of explanations in Classical Genetics the last problem, which relates to the first two ones, will be addressed straightforward. But instead of doing it with “the recent mechanistic type model of explanation”, it will be done with a model-theoretic, structuralist account of explanation. First, explanations in Classical Genetics will be presented in the traditional format of explanations as summarized by arguments. Later on, the nature of these explanations will be discussed by using explanations in another area of science, namely, Classical Mechanics. To clarify the situation, and to carry out an analysis of explanations in Classical Genetics, notions of the structuralist view of theories ‒ especially those of theory-net, fundamental law (or guiding principle), specialization, and special law ‒ will be applied to Classical Genetics. In this application, Classical Genetics’ fundamental law/guiding principle will be made explicit. Next, in order to make more transparent the ontological commitments of Classical Genetics (some of which would play a causal role), explanations will be presented in a model-theoretic, structuralist format as ampliative embeddings into nomic patterns within theory-nets. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of the presented analysis, arguing in favor of the model-theoretic, structuralist account of explanation “that brings together some form of law-like generalizations and of causation”. *References* Balzer, W., Moulines, C.U. and J. Sneed (1987), *An Architectonic for Science. The Structuralist Program*, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1987. Braillard, P.-A. and C. Malaterre (eds.) (2015), *Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences*, Netherlands: Springer. Bartelborth, T. (1996), “Scientific Explanation”, in Balzer, W. and C.U. Moulines (eds.), *Structuralist Theory of Science. Focal Issues, New Results*, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 23-43. Carnap, R. (1950), “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology”, *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4: 20-40. Díez, J.A. (2014), “Scientific w-Explanation as Ampliative, Specialized Embedding: A Neo-Hempelian Account”, *Erkenntnis* 79(8): 1413-1443. Díez, J.A. and P. Lorenzano (2015), “Are Natural Selection Explanatory Models A Priori?”, *Biology & Philosophy* 30(6): 787-809. Forge, J. (2002), “Reflections on Structuralism and Scientific Explanation”, *Synthese* 130: 109-121. Lorenzano, P. (2000), “Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics”, in Balzer, W., Moulines, C.U. and J.D. Sneed (eds.), *Structuralist Knowledge Representation: Paradigmatic Examples*, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 251-284. Lorenzano, P. (2005), “Comentarios a ‘Explicación teórica y compromisos ontológicos: un modelo estructuralista’ de C.U. Moulines”, *Enrahonar: **quaderns de filosofia* 37: 55-59. Lorenzano, P. (2007), “The Influence of Genetics on Philosophy of Science: Classical Genetics and the Structuralist View of Theories”, in Fagot-Largeault, A., Torres, J.M. and S. Rahman (eds.), *The Influence of Genetics on Contemporary Thinking*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 99-115. Reutlinger, A. (2014), “The Generalizations of Biology: Historical and Contingent?”, in M.I. Kaiser et al. (eds.), *Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Case of Biology and History*, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 131-153. Woodward, J. (2001), “Law and Explanation in Biology: Invariance Is the Kind of Stability That Matters”, *Philosophy of Science* 68(1): 1-20. Woodward, J. (2010), “Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation”, *Biology & Philosophy* 25(3): 287-318. Waters, K, (2007), “Causes that Make a Difference”, *Journal of Philosophy* CIV: 551-579 Vous retrouverez ces informations et la biographie de l'intervenant sur la page du séminaire <http://ihpst.cnrs.fr/activites/seminaires/seminaire-epistemod-03-pablo-lorenzano> . Les prochaines séances du séminaire EpistéMod <http://www.ihpst.cnrs.fr/activites/seminaires/seminaire-epistemod> se tiendront les *mardis 12 mars, 2 avril et 21 mai 2019 de 15h à 17h.* *Organisation : * Pour des raisons de sécurité liées à la capacité d'accueil de la salle, l'*inscription préalable au séminaire est fortement recommandée*. Au plaisir de vous voir. Cordialement, Franck Varenne et Vincent Ardourel Pour toute question, la FAQ de la liste se trouve ici: https://www.vidal-rosset.net/
