Chères et chers collègues, Pour la prochaine séance de notre séminaire de recherche en épistémologie sociale et formelle, nous sommes ravis d’accueillir Liam Kofi Bright (London School of Economics).
Titre: “ Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors” résumé ci-dessous travail en collaboration avec avec Haixin Dang Date : 4 mars 2020, 13h-15h Lieu : Maison de la Recherche, 28 rue Serpente, 75006 Paris, salle S001 (prévoyez une carte d’identité ou une carte professionnelle pour accéder au bâtiment). En espérant vous voir nombreux. *Les étudiants sont particulièrement les bienvenus.* Ce séminaire est financé par les laboratoires SND (Sorbonne Université, UMR8011, Paris), les Archives Poincaré (Université de Lorraine, UMR 7117, Nancy) et le MAPP (Université de Poitiers, EA 2626). En vous remerciant de votre attention, Les organisateurs (Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Cyrille Imbert, Isabelle Drouet, Cédric Paternotte). Contact : thomas.boyer.kassem (at) univ-poitiers (point) fr ; Cyrille.Imbert (at) univ-lorraine (point) fr *Liam Kofi Bright** (LSE, Paris). “*Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors” with Haixin Dang Abstract. Assertions are, speaking roughly, descriptive statements which purport to describe some fact about the world. Philosophers have given a lot of attention to the idea that assertions come with special norms governing their behaviour. Frequently, in fact, philosophers claim that for something to count as an assertion it has to be governed by these norms. So what exactly are the norms of assertion? Here there is disagreement. Some philosophers believe assertions are governed by special factive norms, to the effect that an assertion must be true, or known to be true, or known with certainty to be true - or in any case that an assertion is normatively good just in case it meets some condition that entails its truth. Other philosophers place weaker epistemic constraints on good assertion. For instance the claim that an assertion is justified given the assertor's evidence. We use this literature to think through the norms concerning a special class of scientific utterances - namely, the conclusions of scientific papers, or more generally the sort of utterances scientists use to communicate the results of their latest inquiry. Such utterances might look like paradigm instances of descriptive statements purporting to describe some fact, yet as we shall argue the norms of assertion philosophers have surveyed are systematically inapt for science. Scientific conclusions may justly be put forward even though they are neither known, true, justifiably believed, nor even believed at all. We argue that understanding this has implications for how one understands the significance of the replication crisis in scientific inquiry and how it ought to be responded to. After surveying our argument for this negative claim, we end by suggesting a norm that scientific conclusions may reasonably be held to satisfy in good cases. *Calendrier des séances en 2019-2020 * 6 novembre 2019 : Dunja Šešelja (TU Eindhoven) 27 novembre 2019 : Igor Douven (Paris, CNRS, SND) 22 janvier 2020 : Mikaël Cozic (Université Paris 12, IHPST, ENS) 4 mars 2020 : Liam Kofi Bright (London School of Economics) 6 mai : Aidan Lyon (University of Amsterdam) 17 juin : Stephen John (University of Cambridge) -- https://www.vidal-rosset.net/mailing_list_educasupphilo.html
