Chères et chers collègues,

La prochaine séance du séminaire * Liberté d'expression
<https://egalibex.univ-lyon3.fr/2021/09/16/la-liberte-dexpression-2020-2021-3/>*
aura
lieu le *lundi** 31 janvier 2022, 16h-18h, en ligne. *

Peter Niesen
<https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-sowi/professuren/niesen/team/niesen-peter.html>,
Université de Hambourg, interviendra sur le thème :

*Kant and Rawls on Free Speech in Autocracies*

* (résumé infra). *

La participation au séminaire se fait *sur inscription préalable*, auprès
de: seminaire.egali...@gmail.com

Très cordialement,

Pierre Auriel, Charles Girard et Clotilde Nouët


*Séminaire « La liberté d’expression
<https://egalibex.univ-lyon3.fr/2021/09/16/la-liberte-dexpression-2020-2021-3/>
»*


organisé à l’Institut de Recherches Philosophiques de Lyon

par Pierre Auriel (Lyon 3), Charles Girard (Lyon 3)

et Clotilde Nouët (Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique)



dans le cadre du programme ANR Jeune Chercheur « EgaLibEx
<https://droitphil.hypotheses.org/programmes/egalibex> »  et du

programme COMOD « La liberté d’expression : généalogies, modèles,
institutions
<https://droitphil.hypotheses.org/programmes/la-liberte-dexpression-genealogies-modeles-institutions>
 »



Résumé:

In the works of Kant and Rawls, we find an acute sensibility to the
pre-eminent importance of freedom of speech. Both authors defend free
speech in democratic societies as a private and as a public entitlement,
but their conceptions markedly differ when applied to non-liberal and
non-democratic societies. The difference is that freedom of speech, for
Kant, is a universal claim that can serve as a test of legitimacy of all
legal orders, while for Rawls, some legal orders are owed full recognition
even if they do not in principle guarantee freedom of speech. I explain
Kant’s account of free political speech and argue that the defence of
individual rights should be seen as its core feature, both in republican
and in autocratic states. I then argue that a much-overlooked shift in
Rawls’s development to Political Liberalism likewise ties his account of
free speech in democratic societies to issues concerning rights and
justice. In a next step, I discuss Rawls’s perspective on some
non-democratic regimes in his Law of Peoples, regimes that he understands
as well-ordered but which do not guarantee freedom of speech. I criticize
Rawls’s account from Kant’s perspective and suggest to introduce a ‘module’
from Kant’s pre-republican thought into Rawls’s conception, aiming to
secure a core area of rights- and justice-related speech. My claim is that
under Kant’s view of autocratic legitimacy, an important extension of
speech rights is called for even in non-liberal, non-democratic states, and
that a Rawlsian account should and can adopt it.

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