Chères et chers collègues, La prochaine séance du séminaire * Liberté d'expression <https://egalibex.univ-lyon3.fr/2021/09/16/la-liberte-dexpression-2020-2021-3/>* aura lieu le *lundi** 31 janvier 2022, 16h-18h, en ligne. *
Peter Niesen <https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fachbereich-sowi/professuren/niesen/team/niesen-peter.html>, Université de Hambourg, interviendra sur le thème : *Kant and Rawls on Free Speech in Autocracies* * (résumé infra). * La participation au séminaire se fait *sur inscription préalable*, auprès de: seminaire.egali...@gmail.com Très cordialement, Pierre Auriel, Charles Girard et Clotilde Nouët *Séminaire « La liberté d’expression <https://egalibex.univ-lyon3.fr/2021/09/16/la-liberte-dexpression-2020-2021-3/> »* organisé à l’Institut de Recherches Philosophiques de Lyon par Pierre Auriel (Lyon 3), Charles Girard (Lyon 3) et Clotilde Nouët (Université Mohammed VI Polytechnique) dans le cadre du programme ANR Jeune Chercheur « EgaLibEx <https://droitphil.hypotheses.org/programmes/egalibex> » et du programme COMOD « La liberté d’expression : généalogies, modèles, institutions <https://droitphil.hypotheses.org/programmes/la-liberte-dexpression-genealogies-modeles-institutions> » Résumé: In the works of Kant and Rawls, we find an acute sensibility to the pre-eminent importance of freedom of speech. Both authors defend free speech in democratic societies as a private and as a public entitlement, but their conceptions markedly differ when applied to non-liberal and non-democratic societies. The difference is that freedom of speech, for Kant, is a universal claim that can serve as a test of legitimacy of all legal orders, while for Rawls, some legal orders are owed full recognition even if they do not in principle guarantee freedom of speech. I explain Kant’s account of free political speech and argue that the defence of individual rights should be seen as its core feature, both in republican and in autocratic states. I then argue that a much-overlooked shift in Rawls’s development to Political Liberalism likewise ties his account of free speech in democratic societies to issues concerning rights and justice. In a next step, I discuss Rawls’s perspective on some non-democratic regimes in his Law of Peoples, regimes that he understands as well-ordered but which do not guarantee freedom of speech. I criticize Rawls’s account from Kant’s perspective and suggest to introduce a ‘module’ from Kant’s pre-republican thought into Rawls’s conception, aiming to secure a core area of rights- and justice-related speech. My claim is that under Kant’s view of autocratic legitimacy, an important extension of speech rights is called for even in non-liberal, non-democratic states, and that a Rawlsian account should and can adopt it. -- https://www.vidal-rosset.net/mailing_list_educasupphilo.html