Call for Papers

*7th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology: Arts and Sciences,
Historicizing Boundaries*
Venice, 9-10 June 2022

*Confirmed keynote speakers:*

Peter Galison <https://galison.scholar.harvard.edu/> (Harvard)
Catherine Jones <https://architecture.mit.edu/faculty/caroline-jones> (MIT)

*Abstract* [for full abstract see here
<https://episthist.hypotheses.org/2958>]

The 7th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology is dedicated to
exploring new ways of approaching the historical, conceptual,
methodological, and technical relations between the arts and the sciences.
Rather than looking for logical criteria for demarcating these domains, the
workshop aims to question the arts/sciences dyad from the vantage point of
its history.

If the armchair philosopher recognizes demarcations among cognitive,
perceptual, or operational domains, what can historical epistemology teach
us about the boundary lines or relationship between the arts and the
sciences? What might a historicized approach to the epistemological
question of the different ways of accessing reality, of capturing or
intervening in the world, add to our discussion? Can the distinction
between scientific discovery and artistic creation be tackled from the
point of view of historical epistemology? At the methodological level, can
the history of the sciences fruitfully mesh with art history? Can art
historians, historians of science, philosophers and cultural historians
learn from each other’s methods? These transversal questions—cutting across
the human, social, and natural sciences—have bearing on the “boundary
questions” situated at the borders of the arts and sciences. While this
workshop aims to move beyond the idea of a “binary economy,” (Galison &
Jones, *Picturing Science, Producing Art*, 1998) it also aims to keep the
specificity of each in sight.

Although it does not appear at the forefront of French epistemology, the
careful observer will notice that this topic was taken up by a number of
historical epistemologists. Gaston Bachelard, for instance, identified an
irremovable divide between epistemology and the poetic imagination but he
also considered it possible for the latter to underpin or contribute to the
former (Chimisso, Bachelard, *Critic of Science and the Imagination*,
2001). This aspect of Bachelard’s work could be put fruitfully in dialogue
with later analogous attempts to make similar connections in the Anglophone
domain (Holton, *The Scientific Imagination*, 1978). Bachelard moreover
insisted on the creative dimension of scientific thinking and its
technological inventiveness (Bachelard, *The New Scientific Spirit*, 1934),
claiming that science can, to some extent, be regarded as an artistic
creation belonging to both the human mind and the material world. Georges
Canguilhem, on the one hand, maintained that knowledge and truth pertain
only to science, which in this respect is “incommensurable” with other
forms of cultural expression (e.g., the arts) underpinned and motivated by
different values such as beauty. However, in his early writings, Canguilhem
also reflected at length on the problem of artistic and technical creation
and later came to consider medicine an “art”: a set of techniques situated
at the crossroads of different scientific disciplines and aimed at the
production of new norms of existence for organisms. Canguilhem’s work thus
rested on a philosophy which appealed to a multiplicity of irreducible
values and mobilized a Nietzschean perspective according to which the task
of philosophy is to compare and contrast scientific, religious, ethical,
and aesthetic values. In a similar vein, Michel Foucault suggested that the
tools he deployed in his archeology of scientific knowledge could also be
applied to art history (Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*, 1969). His
famous comment on Las Meninas in The Order of Things suggests that analysis
of artistic productions is a means of investigating the structure of
knowledge. Despite inheriting Bachelard's divide between art and science,
Gilles-Gaston Granger instead wondered whether the artistic notion of style
could be applied to the analysis of scientific knowledge (Granger, *Essai
d’une philosophie du style*, 1968). Finally, Jean-Claude Passeron’s
work—premised upon the sociology of art and culture, on the one hand, and
upon the epistemology of the social sciences on the other—raises questions
about the extent to which these two origins of his work are completely
separate or constantly in dialogue (Passeron, *Sociological Reasoning*,
1991).

These themes will be at the center of the 7th Workshop on Historical
Epistemology. We hope the discussion will be a moment for philosophers,
historians of philosophy, historians, philosophers of science, and art
historians to encounter scholars with different methodological approaches.
In particular, we expect contributions falling along the following three
axes:

   1. *Historical epistemology *Can the arts/science dyad be an object of
   inquiry for historical epistemology? What are the larger epistemological
   and sociological goals that the dyad underpins or tries to respond to? Can
   we still talk of there being “two cultures”? Are there more than two? Or is
   there only one undifferentiated culture? To what extent is the term
   “culture” even appropriate? We welcome contributions tracing the
   trajectories of debates that have drawn the two poles of this dyad together
   or pushed them apart.
   2. *Philosophy/methodology* What can an historicized approach to
   epistemology teach us about the boundary lines or relationship between the
   arts and the sciences? What do the concepts of "style" and "method" have in
   common and what distinguishes them from each other? Contributions should
   propose ways of rethinking topics at the intersection of the two
   activities, such as representation, progress, perception, theory change,
   analogies, the role of “method”, the affordances of techniques and
   technologies, and differences between scientific invention/discovery and
   artistic creation.
   3. *History of historical epistemology* Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault
   or Granger are only examples: how have historical epistemologists writ
   large taken up this issue? Contributions might address thinkers coming from
   the French tradition or who employ the later historical epistemological
   approach that emerged from research groups at the Max Planck Institute for
   the History of Science or from other strands of epistemology that reflected
   on the divide between the arts and the sciences.

Proposals (500 words plus a short presentation of the candidate) must be
sent *by March 15, 2022* (notification of acceptance or refusal by March
31), in .doc format, to epistemologiehistori...@gmail.com. The workshop
will be conducted in English. Applicants should be ready for possible
online participation in case the event should move to online-only.

*This workshop is organized by:*

Épistémologie Historique. Research Network on the History and the Methods
of Historical Epistemology <https://episthist.hypotheses.org/>

*With the support of: *

Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Department of Philosophy and Cultural
Heritage;
European Commission (This project has received funding from the European
Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101030646, “EPISTYLE”);
IHPST (UMR 8590, Paris 1/CNRS);
République des Savoirs (USR 3608, ENS/ Collège de France/CNRS);
École doctorale Lettres, Arts, Sciences humaines et sociales (ED 540, ENS –
EUR Translitteræ, PSL);
Centre Gilles Gaston Granger (UMR 7304).

*Organizing committee:*

Caroline Angleraux (Labex Who Am I?, Associate member of the IHPST)
Thomas Embleton (IHPST)
Lucie Fabry (ENS-PSL, République des savoirs / Aix Marseille Université,
Centre Gilles- Gaston Granger)
Iván Moya-Diez (Universidad Alberto Hurtado)
Matteo Vagelli (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia)

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