On 04.07.21 11:03, Cedric Hombourger wrote: > Our concept is twofold: (1) use SecureBoot to make sure we are booted > from a trusted boot-loader + trusted Linux kernel (both are signed with > keys loaded into the trust store) (2) extend the root of trust by > mounting a LUKS encrypted volume with the key in the TPM and sealed with > selected PCRs. In an A/B scheme, we may have the same encryption key > placed both in slot[A] and slot[B] but sealed as follows:
I do get the point of using measurements to keep the platform open for non-secure boots but protect the secretes to define boot chains. But I do not get the use case of booting only well-defined secure images and then additionally measuring them on top to unlock secrets. What's the added value? The downside is the need to maintain the measuring values in addition, right? Jan -- Siemens AG, T RDA IOT Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "EFI Boot Guard" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/efibootguard-dev/c1e9f033-2b35-2d2c-df26-ccf2dc76476f%40siemens.com.
