Dear Craig, you wrote (18 Dec 2003): > Let's consider the algorithm itself. Here I quote from the VM 17 > PDF file: > > --- > : Suppose that d[X,Y] is the number of voters who > : strictly prefer candidate X to candidate Y. Then the > : Smith set is the smallest non-empty set of candidates > : with d[A,B] > d[B,A] for each candidate B outside this > : set. > --- > > The English text of Schulze probably seems to imply this > interpretation: > > * Let there be only 3 candidates. Let the ballot papers be these: > > 2 (CA) > 5 (CAB) > 1 (CBA) > > What is Mr Schulze's d[A,B] ?. > > We could look at the computer algorithm source code but it takes > the "d" matrix as an input. The vote counting algorithm can't actually > accept votes. > > The d[A,B] value would be: > > (Interpretation 1) the number 7, or > (Interpretation 2) the number 5, or > (Interpretation 3) the number 6, or > (Interpretation 4) the number 4, or > > I suppose Interpretations 3 and 4 can be rejected. > > ...
In the Introduction of the quoted paper, I write: "It is presumed that each voter casts at least a partial ranking of all candidates." Markus Schulze ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
