This paper must be part of a series, as Woodall never explains his assertion that "Of these three properties, Majority is far and away the most important." He seems to have his own definitions for monotonicity; I hadn't seen these anywhere else.
But the publication appears to be devoted to issues surrounding STV, so maybe some things are simply assumed here. Bart Chris Benham wrote: > > Quoting D.R. Woodall, > > "Later-no-harm: Adding a later preference to a ballot should not harm > any candidate already listed". > > In other words, if a method meets Later-no-harm then voters can never > get an advantage by truncating. > It is met by IRV, but is incompatible with Condorcet. > I got this from what I found to be the very interesting and illuminating > paper "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election > Rules" by Woodall, and uploaded by Marcus Schulze: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/files/wood1996.pdf ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
