Good work Ernie.
Thanks.
So this would be just such a case, where due to the extremely precise knowledge and the hair's-breadth nature of the election, the marginal utility for each additional point for candidate C is not constant. If we were to make this election have a plausible level of uncertainty, say:
(I) 40% chance: A: 101,000 B: 102,000 C: 104,000
(II) 60% chance: A: 100,000 B: 104,000 C: 105,000
Then the optimal strategy is to give B 5 points if the preference gap between C and B is at least twice as big as the preference gap between A and B, and one point if it is not.
Sure, for an individual voter. But let me pose a question for you. Say I was the party chieftain for the X party, and my 1,000 loyal followers (who all prefer A > B > C) ask me how they should vote. Given the above expected breakdown from other voters, would it not make sense for me to ask all my followers to vote 5:3:1? (or something similar, I haven't done the calculation)
-- Ernie P.
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