Chris Benham wrote: > > To seriously make the case that IRV is not better than Plurality, > instead of talking about the made-up example a person > should > (a) make the case that compliance with mostly sundry mathematical > neatness criteria (like Participation and Monotoncity) > weigh as much as compliance with (mutual) Majority and Clone > Independence.
Any particular reason that the burden of proof should be on those favoring criteria other than Mutual Majority and Clone Independence? Regardless, I give at least as much weight to FBC and freedom from Duvergerian equilibria. My reasoning is that if there are always two strong parties, there is really no need to look further at election method properties. Voters will either vote so as to favor one of the two relevant alternatives, or abstain in order to cast a protest vote. Clone independence seems worthwhile, in that substantial failure would result in either a Duvergerian system or a rich-party problem. But I don't see any practical value in Mutual Majority, which if met by IRV must be similar to Condorcet Loser. > (b) and/or point to some computer simulations which show something Merrill's simulations show plenty. > (c) and/or maybe even point to some real-life examles. IRV has been in > use in public political elections for most of a century. ...with apparently the same two-party outcomes as Plurality over the long haul. Even if you view this as anecdotal and not proof of a two-party bias, there is still a lack of evidence to the contrary. Which is where the burden of proof should be if attempting to push through an expensive "reform". Bart Ingles ---- Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info